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PREFACE
Public policy continues to evolve, affecting this nation's food
supply, prices, and trade, as well as the economic welfare of its
farmers and rural communities. During 1980-1981 policy decision
makers, organization leaders, and representatives of consumers and
farmers will be especially concerned with these policy decisions in
view of the approaching termination of the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1977.
This publication provides a synthesis and interpretation of the
existing knowledge on food and agricultural policy issues that should
be useful to the various participants involved in these upcoming
public decisions. It presents objectively the characteristics of the
primary public policy problems, the trends in relevant economic
data, the provisions and consequences of the 1977 Act, and selected
policy alternatives.
The research underlying this publication was pursued by an inter-
regional team of researchers from several states and the USDA. It
was authorized and is published under the auspices of a North
Central Regional Policy Research Project—designed to provide
Scooperative professional attention to this important area of the
nation's agricultural and food policy. A brief glossary of selected
terms and concepts pertaining to this research is included at the end
of this publication to facilitate its usefulness to the range of intended
readers.
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1POLICY
ENVIRONMENT
ANDALTERNATIVES
Marshall A. Martin and R.G.F. Spitze
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Analysis of Food and Agricultural Policies for the Eighties is a
synthesis of current research knowledge on the public problems and
policies concerned with: farm product prices, food prices and supply,
farm family income, income transfers for food, agricultural trade,
and their Treasury costs. Food and farm policy discussions some-
times speak to problems and interests of consumers as though they
were separate from those of farm producers. In contrast, this analysis
emphasizes their interrelationships in the actual policy development
process. Other policy areas such as credit, land use, rural development,
and tax policy are not addressed in this publication. The primary
focus of the bulletin is on the policy provisions contained in the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977.
The public of this nation will have the opportunity, and indeed
responsibility, to make major decisions about its agricultural and
food system prior to December 31, 1981. That marks the termina-
tion of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. This Act has set the
policy course for the period 1977-1981 for such programs as: food
stamps, a farmer-owned national grain reserve, farm commodity
price supports, land set-aside, deficiency payments and disaster
protection, food aid to foreign countries, selected international
trade provisions for agricultural products, and research and educa-
tion activities for many areas of the food system.
Marshall A. Martin and R.G.F. Spitze are assistant professor of agricultural
economics, Purdue University, and professor of agricultural economics, Univer-
sity of Illinois, respectively.
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Prior to that date national attention will be focused on under-
standing the evolving economic situation and on developing alterna-
tive policy proposals. Questions must be answered about the nation's
vital food supply, the equity impacts of policies on affected interest
groups, effects of program costs on inflation, and the future structure
of the agricultural sector. While discussions often prevail at broad
levels of generality, policies are often designed to serve the parti-
cular needs posed by regions and commodities. Congress and the
Executive Branch will be debating and choosing a public policy
position about these same questions in the months prior to the
expiration of the 1977 Act. The outcome will be a package of
provisions from an infinite array of alternatives, ranging from extend-
ing the present policy without change to allowing its termination
with subsequent reversion to existing permanent farm legislation.
These public policy decisions will be determined by the knowledge
of the numerous participants, their varied experiences, their different
values and goals, and by eventual consensus and compromise among
them. Knowledge will be gleaned from documents generated over a
half century of agricultural and food policy experience, from current
media sources, from accumulated research, and from new analyses
specific to the relevant policy area.
The purpose of this bulletin is to provide research knowledge for
policy decision makers, their staffs, and other professional policy
workers. Future research needs are also identified. This bulletin
represents the joint efforts of policy researchers in Land Grant
Universities, the Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service of
USDA, and other federal research agencies under the auspices of the
regional Hatch Cooperative State- Federal Research Program. As a
source of current reliable information, it will join other similar
publications of Congressional committees, federal Executive offices,
and many private research organizations.
Sources for this bulletin include the current findings of policy
research as reported in professional journals and bulletins, the
extensive documentation of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977,
the literature of the past half century in the agricultural and food
policy area, and the insights of a selected group of professional
policy workers from the several regions of the nation and from
Washington D.C. Those findings arise from a systematic review,
synthesis, and interpretation of existing theoretical and empirical
knowledge. Particular emphasis is given to the content and conse-
quences of the 1977 Act, since it serves as a primary base for future
policy discussions and choices.
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In the policy formation process individuals, private organizations,
and public officials will propose and defend specific policies. The
quality of those proposals for helping shape the best policy in
the public interest depends upon the quality of the knowledge
available to and understood by those offering the proposals. This
publication will describe past policies, present policy, and possible
alternative future policies. It attempts to report objective, reliable
information—positive knowledge in logical terms—and is not intended
to propose, promote, or advocate a particular policy. The policy
formation process itself will decide what future policy will best
represent the public interest.
CONTENTS
Introduction, Review of the 1977 Act and Economic Trends.
Attention is given to the origin, rationale, and evaluation of the 1977
Act and to the content of its specific provisions. Data for the time
period 1960-1979 are presented for several critical variables, e.g.,
production, prices, income, and trade, that commonly are used in
characterizing the policy problems and evaluating the effects of past
policies.
Policy Problems and Alternatives for the 1980s. The policy prob-
lems believed most likely to be important in the 1980-1981 policy
formation period are briefly and succintly analyzed. These particular
problems were chosen either because they have continued as critical
price and income issues or because new concerns have recently
emerged. Their selection was based on the judgments of a large group
of professional policy workers. The topics selected reflect the key
provisions in the 1977 Act and the issues and concerns frequently
raised by farmers, consumers, and various farm leaders and policy
makers. The policy problem areas treated in this publication are:
1. Farm prices and income.
2. Agricultural policy and food prices.
3. Agricultural trade policy issues.
4. Structural changes in farming.
5. Grain reserve policies in an uncertain world.
6. The food stamp program.
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For each area the analysis systematically covers the following
aspects of the policy problem:
1. Characteristics of the problem.
2. Theoretical and empirical research.
3. Recent data.
4. Selected policy alternatives.
Each of the selected policy alternatives could be a logical public
response to solve the problem. Included with each alternative are
specific provisions or packages of policy instruments, along with the
expected consequences for the major economic sectors including
consumers, producers, traders, rural communities, and taxpayers.
For each of the first four problem areas only those consequences
for the economic sectors most directly affected are analyzed. Com-
mon alternatives are presented for these same four problem areas.
Since the last two problem areas—grain reserve policies in an uncer-
tain world and the food stamp program—have distinctive character-
istics, they follow a different format. Special emphasis is given to
innovative—perhaps untried—policy alternatives to provide maximum
knowledge for policy makers.
COMMON ALTERNATIVES FOR ANALYSIS
A common set of selected policy alternatives are discussed below
for the first four policy problems identified above. These policy
alternatives were chosen to represent those both likely to receive
attention in the policy development process and to encompass a
range of the different possibilities. The analysis emphasizes the
commodity provisions and not the food stamp, grain reserves, foreign
food aid, disaster, or research provisions.
Continuation of the 1977 Act (the CONTINUATION alternative)
If the primary commodity provisions of the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1977 were continued, a nonrecourse price support loan would
be set each year at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture
to stabilize prices for most crops. They would be no less than those
listed for the most recent year in Table 1 (at the end of this chapter)
and would generally reflect yearly average equilibrium and world
prices. To qualify for this and other benefits, producers would need
to comply with any minimal set-aside (optional production control)
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requirements in effect. Temporary government stocks would be used
to support this minimum price (loan level) by evening out supply
over the marketing period with either annual storage and reseal
prerogatives or a three to five-year grain reserve.
Furthermore, set-aside and additional paid diversion would be
used (optional to producers) to balance and stabilize production over
time so that on the average all production would move through the
commercial market eventually at or above the minimum loan level.
This production control approach would focus only on the land
input, and relate the set-aside to the current planted acreage of that
commodity and relate the total crop acreage of the farm to some
nationally desirable proportion of the historical total crop acreage.
Finally, for added income protection to producers, a target price
would be set for each commodity at a level that reflects changes in
a two-year moving average of per unit costs of production. These
production costs would include variable inputs, machinery overhead,
and general farm overhead operations, but not land. The target
price would follow the same path as those depicted for the years
contained in Table 1. For eligible producers, this level of income
return per unit would be assured, based on their production. The
returns would come either from the marketplace or from the market
price plus a compensatory payment from the government to make
up any difference between the target level and the higher of the
average market price or the loan level. A limitation would exist on
the total of these payments to any producer of about $50,000 per
year.
Compensatory Payments (the COMPENSATORY alternative)
This alternative emphasizes income protection to producers of
farm products without any production controls or interference in
market prices. A total per unit target return deemed desirable in
public policy would be established for every affected product at
the commencement of the production year. The compensatory pay-
ment would be based on a target price level approximately between
the price support and target price provisions of the CONTINUATION
alternative. Producers would make their independent production and
marketing decisions based on this average expected return. With
all production moving through domestic and foreign markets at
market clearing levels, any resulting discrepancy between the average
market price achieved and the target unit returns would be compen-
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sated on the average with direct government payments to producers
based on the volume of their sales. Since not all producers would
produce the same quantity/quality of product nor receive the same
market price, the uniform per unit payments would preserve the
spread of individual returns around the averages of all producers.
The stable target return, at least equal to equilibrium levels, would
tend to bring forth a positive supply response, which in turn would
lower market prices to both consumers and producers, resulting in
expanding compensatory payments to the latter.
Since no monitoring of inputs nor stocks of price-supported
products are associated with this alternative, it could be used for any
product, such as livestock and perishable fruits and vegetables. The
wool incentive payment program in effect since 1954 symbolizes
this approach.
Effective Production Control (the CONTROL alternative)
This alternative emphasizes both price stability and income pro-
tection to major crop producers through a higher minimum loan
(price support) for eligible production and through sufficiently
effective production control provisions to ensure that the quantity
being supplied over time would clear the market at the loan level.
Minor shifts in the controlled production would be dramatically
translated into income changes through the highly inelastic market
demand. Thus, in comparison with the CONTINUATION alternative,
the loan level would be higher, approximating its target price level,
and the production control feature would likely be more restraining.
Government stocks would only be temporary to even out the
quantity supplied within and between the marketing years. The loan
level would float based on changes in the variable costs of produc-
tion—similar to target prices in the CONTINUATION alternative.
Production control would be achieved similarly through regulating
the land input of the planted acreage on each affected producer's
farm. Sufficient restrictions on imports and adequate export assis-
tance for the price-supported commodities would be necessary to
assure access to, but prevent interference from, foreign markets.
Two different means of achieving the effective production control
are possible.
Compulsory Control Option. With the compulsory option, the goal
of effective production control is achieved by mandatory restriction
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3n each producer's use of a prime resource, i.e., land, or quantity
Df product marketed. Such a method usually would be selected fol-
ilowing a favorable referendum among all producers. Since all pro-
ducers of the affected crop must comply, the benefits of price
isupports are likewise available to them. Much more rigidity in
cropping patterns and restrictions on entrepreneurial decisions on
resource allocation accompanies this option as compared to the
voluntary approach. The configuration of this option would resemble
ithe existing tobacco policy and the policies generally in place for
major crops throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
Voluntary Control Option. With the voluntary option, the goal of
effective production control is achieved by sufficient inducements
to evoke from producers adequate voluntary withdrawal of produc-
tion inputs, land, fertilizer, etc. Hence, those producers who perceive
an economic advantage will participate and receive the loan (price
support) and any other benefits, while others who rely solely on the
market returns will not. Considerable entrepreneurial independence
and flexible resource allocation discretion would remain. The induce-
ments would likely necessitate direct government payments in addi-
tion to loan benefits. Partly due to the opposition of producers to
compulsory programs of the previous decade, policy shifted toward
this voluntary approach for most crops in the 1960s.
Innovative Alternatives
For each of the first four problem areas, one additional policy
alternative is described and analyzed. These policy alternatives are
presented as innovative approaches, different from those tried or
commonly considered for these persistent problems in the agricul-
tural and food area. It is hoped that they will provide new insights
for the upcoming policy development process.
HISTORICAL TRENDS: 1960-1979 1
During the period 1960-1979 there were substantial changes in
the economic characteristics particularly important to agricultural
and food policy. In order to adjust for inflationary trends in the
economy, 1972 will be used as the base year for "constant dollars."
Farm prices, cash receipts, capital gains, and income were highly
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variable. Export sales increased sharply. Foreign food aid declined
in relative importance, i.e., in percent of all exports and in constant
dollars. Government food and agricultural program payments were
variable. Off-farm income became a major source of income for farm
families. The structure of American agriculture also exhibited con-
siderable and persistent change toward fewer but larger farms. Farm
productivity and total output continued their historic recurring
increase.
Prices
During the period 1960-1979, farm prices doubled, increasing
at an annual rate of 4.5 to 5.0 percent—about the same rate as the
Consumer Price Index, the Food Price Index, the Prices Paid by
Farmers Index, the Producer Price Index, and the Implicit GNP
Deflator. However, the patterns have been different. Farm prices
lagged the others in the 1960s, far exceeded them in the early 1970s,
and substantially followed again in recent years. After a period of
relatively stable prices, farm and food prices have become more
erratic and divergent. In the earlier period crop prices fell behind
those of livestock, then surged ahead. In the late 1970s crop prices
tended to fall while livestock prices, especially cattle, tended to
increase.
Income
Current cash receipts from farming and gross farm income grew
at an annual rate of 7 percent in 1960-1979. In constant dollars
cash receipts and gross farm income grew about 2.4 percent per year.
However, there were substantial oscillations within the period. While
cash receipts from farming and gross farm income in constant
dollars were unchanged to declining slightly in the 1960s, they rose
sharply in the early 1970s. But by the late 1970s gross farm income
and cash receipts in constant dollars were declining.
Government farm program payments were increasing more rapidly
than market receipts, adding from $1.0 to $4.4 billion annually to
gross farm income in constant dollars throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s. In the mid-1970s they fell sharply to less than $1.0
billion per year, but they have been increasing again since 1977.
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Throughout this period rapid increases in the value of physical
assets provided another major source of potential income for many
farm families. Of course, property would have to be sold to realize
this income. Also by 1970 off-farm income for the first time was
contributing over half of all income received by farm families. The
importance of off-farm income has grown throughout the period,
except in 1973-1974 when there was a sharp increase in farm income.
Per capita disposable farm income as a percent of nonfarm per capita
disposable income rose from about 50 percent in 1960 to 110 per-
cent in 1973. However, disposable per capita farm income has again
lagged behind that of the nonfarm sector since 1973.
Aggregate net farm income in current and constant dollars grew
much more slowly than gross farm income throughout the period.
This was especially true in the 1970s relative to the 1960s when
inflationary pressures began to push up input costs. Not only has
growth in net farm income in constant dollars been negligible over
the two-decade period, but it has also been erratic.
Agricultural Trade
U.S. agricultural exports grew slowly in the decade of the sixties,
and then increased dramatically in the 1970s. The value of U.S.
agricultural exports in constant dollars experienced a three-fold
increase from 1960 to 1979. This growth made a substantial contri-
bution to the increase in farm prices and income. Currently agri-
cultural export sales account for one out of every four dollars of
U.S. gross farm income. U.S. agricultural exports grew more rapidly
than imports, contributing to a steady positive growth in the U.S.
agricultural balance of trade.
Output and Productivity
Total farm output has consistently increased in the 1960s and
1970s at a rate of about 1.8 percent per year, with a lower rate in
the early and a higher rate in the later part of the past decade.
Farm productivity increases were similar.
Farm labor productivity grew faster than nonfarm labor produc-
tivity—about 6 percent for farm workers versus 2 percent for nonfarm
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workers. However, growth in labor productivity dropped slightly
in both sectors in the 1970s.
Structural Change
As a result of changing economic conditions, the structure of
U.S. agriculture also changed throughout the period. Average farm
size grew from 300 to 400 acres. The number of farms declined
steadily, about 2 percent per year. The rate of increase in farm size
and the rate of decrease in the number of farms both slowed down
in the 1970s relative to the 1960s.
Throughout the period there was a marked shift in the proportion
of income generated by different classes of farms, with the share of
output produced by the larger farms increasing substantially. Many
public policies are probable causes of these structural changes in
agriculture. However, any changes due to farm commodity programs
are minor relative to such policies as taxation and technology research.
Food Program Costs
Federal costs of all food programs grew dramatically from 1960-
1979. Growth primarily occurred in the food stamp, school lunch,
and WIC (Womens-Infants-Children) programs. The direct distribu-
tion of commodities to needy families has been essentially phased
out. Over half of current total food program outlays go for food
stamps. The rapid growth in participants slowed in the early 1970s.
From 1975 through 1978 there was a decrease in federal support in
constant dollars for the food stamp program and an unchanging total
amount for all food programs. By the late 1970s changes in the food
stamp eligibility requirements, increased unemployment, a continued
high rate of inflation, and the elimination of the purchase require-
ment resulted in a significant increase in the number of food stamp
recipients. Consequently, the spending cap initially set by Congress
for fiscal 1980 was reached by May, and substantial funds were
added in supplemental appropriations.
ENACTMENT, PROVISIONS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
1977 ACT
U.S. food and agricultural policy has been shaped and molded by
an array of economic, technological, political, social, and humani-
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tarian considerations. As a consequence, the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1977 evolved as one of the most comprehensive pieces of
agricultural legislation ever approved. Furthermore, its discretionary
authority permits the Secretary of Agriculture to respond to rapidly
changing economic and political conditions.
Policy Environment
The environment in which the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977
evolved was historically unprecedented. First, the period 1970-1976
was a unique combination of domestic and international events,
which resulted in a sharp increase in farm prices and income. The
high prices and worries over food shortages were followed by pro-
duction increases that drove down farm prices at the same time that
input prices continued to go up, resulting in a sqeeze on farm income.
Periodic shortfalls in world grain production, especially in the
USSR, 2 two major devaluations of the U.S. dollar and an eventual
shift to a floating exchange rate, and continued growth in per capita
income and population in most countries led to sharp increases in
U.S. food prices, farm prices, farm income, and agricultural exports.
Other relevant economic events in the U.S. in the 1970s that affected
the agricultural situation were: wage and price controls, sharp in-
creases in petroleum prices, double-digit inflation, and a severe
economic recession in fiscal 1974/75. However, record U.S. crop
harvests in 1975-1978, expanding world grain production, and a
return of world grain stocks to levels experienced in the early sixties
led to a decline in farm prices and income.
A second aspect of the evolutionary food and agricultural policy
process was an increase in the number and diversity of interest
groups that became concerned with food and agricultural policy.
Environmentalists, consumer groups, and the hunger lobby joined
the traditional farm organizations and commodity groups in helping
to shape the policy agenda.
A third factor was the simultaneous expiration of previous legis-
lation, which included the Agriculture and Consumer Protection
Act of 1973, the Rice Production Act of 1975, funding and authori-
zation for food stamps (the 1964 Food Stamp Act as amended),
and authorization for Public Law 480 food assistance programs
(The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
as extended.)
Bills were passed by both the Senate and House of Representa-
tives in mid-1977 after unusually lengthy consideration. While there
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were numerous modifications in the details of the various provisions
in the legislation by a Senate-House Conference Committee, a major
concern was over the potential Treasury cost. The Senate bill pro-
vided for higher target prices, implying a higher Treasury cost than
the House bill. 3 The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 was finally
approved by the Congress and signed into law by President Carter
in September 1977.
Key Provisions
Although the 1977 Act contains few major changes from previous
legislation, it does introduce important new policy provisions. Set
to expire in 1981, it includes 19 titles that cover all major food and
feed grains, extends Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) programs,
extends and modifies the Food Stamp program, and authorizes addi-
tional food and agricultural research and extension activities. It also
contains legislative provisions for dairy, wool, rice, cotton, peanuts,
soybeans, and sugar.
The 1977 Act gives the Secretary of Agriculture considerable
flexibility to carry out the various policy provisions. Only the pri-
mary provisions are summarized here. 4
Loan Rates and Target Prices. Loan rates provide a price floor.
They are used to determine the value of nonrecourse loans for eli-
gible farmers and are utilized in the determination of trigger prices
for the farmer-owned grain reserve. The Secretary of Agriculture has
considerable discretion to adjust the level of the loan rates.
Target prices, a concept first introduced in the Agriculture and
Consumer Protection Act of 1973, provide the framework for in-
come protection for farmers through deficiency and disaster pay-
ments. Deficiency payments are made to eligible farmers when the
market price falls below a predetermined target price during the first
five months of the marketing year. In the 1977 Act the maximum
allowable annual deficiency payment per farmer for wheat, feed
grains, and upland cotton combined was $50,000 for 1980 and
1981. Target prices and loan rates by year may be found in Table 1.
Disaster payments may be made for wheat and feed grains under
two conditions: prevented plantings and low yields. Originally
applying only through the 1979 crop year, the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1980 extended the disaster payment provisions of
the 1977 Act through the 1980 crop year.
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Cost of Production. Previously, adjustments in commodity price
support levels were based on changes in either parity or an index
of prices paid by farmers for production items and changes in yields.
The 1977 Act provides for annual adjustments of the target prices
initially set for 1977 and 1978, based on USDA estimates of changes
in national average per unit production costs for each commodity.
The per unit cost of production is based on a two-year moving
average of changes in variable costs, machinery ownership costs,
and an allocation of general farm overhead costs, but not land
costs.
Low grain prices and the resulting political pressure in 1977-
1978 led to the Emergency Agricultural Act of 1978. This amended
the 1977 Act, permitting the Secretary to increase the target prices
for wheat, feed grains, and upland cotton when an acreage set-
aside exists. As a result, the Carter Administration made some
upward adjustments in target prices. When no set-aside program is
in effect, the cost of production formula outlined in the 1977 Act
must be utilized.
Although per acre production costs continued to rise, record
yields in 1978 and 1979 coupled with no set-asides in 1980 would
have resulted in lower target prices for wheat and feed grains in
1980. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1980 raises target prices
above the cost of production formula levels provided for by the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (see Table 1).
Set-Aside. The 1977 Act replaced the historical farm acreage
allotment with a new set-aside procedure. The Secretary must an-
nounce each year (before August 15 for wheat, November 15 for
(feed grains, and December 15 for cotton) the voluntary set-aside
procedures and related farm program details for the next crop year.
Farmers who comply with the set-aside program are eligible for
various program benefits, including deficiency payments, disaster
payments, nonrecourse loans and the farmer-owned grain reserve.
(See Table 1 for program details.)
Grain Reserves. The 1977 Act authorized a farmer-owned grain
reserve, with the government setting minimum price support, inter-
mediate release, and maximum call price levels. A wheat reserve of
300 to 700 million bushels is mandated with the Secretary author-
ized to determine the size of the feed grain reserve.
The grain reserve allows farmers to continue a nonrecourse loan
on their grain for three to five years with a prepaid storage payment
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and some interest and farm storage loan concessions. The maximum
storage period so far has been three years. Farmers retain ownership
of the grain and make the final marketing decisions but can be
influenced by penalties. The reserve provides an opportunity for
farmers to store in periods of low prices for later sale once prices
rise. It also helps assure adequate supplies for export sales and aid,
and greater stability of farm prices.
The 1977 Act calls for minimum release levels. 5 If the loan is
redeemed before the market price reaches the release level, the farm-
er must repay the loan plus any accumulated interest and return all
earned and unearned storage payments plus interest (on the storage
payments). The total repayment per bushel is the sum of the above
or the release price, whichever is higher.
The Act also provides for maximum call price levels. 6 The farmer
is not required to remove grain from the reserve when the market
price reaches the release level. The grain may remain in the reserve
until the market price reaches the call level. At that time the loan
must be paid off. The farmer may, however, elect to repay the loan
and hold the grain if the market price is expected to go higher.
If there is grain in the farmer-owned reserve, the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) may not resell any of its stocks accumu-
lated by annual price supporting at less than 150 percent of the
current loan rate. If there is no grain in the reserve, the CCC resale
price may not be less than 115 percent of the loan rate. These CCC
resale limitations were included in the 1977 Act to prevent CCC acti-
vity that farmers felt might unduly depress farm prices.
Food Stamp Program. The 1977 Act identifies human nutrition
as a basic responsibility of the USDA. In order to encourage eligible
nonparticipant households to receive food aid, the food stamp pur-
chase requirement was eliminated and the process for determining
eligibility was simplified. Also, more stringent constraints were
placed on program eligibility.
Implementation of the 1977 Act
The essential features of the 1978 program as provided in the
1977 Act were: a 20 percent set-aside for wheat and 10 percent
set-aside for feed grains; early entry of 1977 crop wheat, barley, and
oats into the grain reserve; an increase in the storage payments for
the farmer-owned reserve; and expansion of farm storage facilities
loans.
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Although the size of the 1978 grain crops set new records, cash
receipts from crops rose 10 percent, and net farm income increased
41 percent over 1977—due largely to a jump in exports and the
initiation of the grain reserve program. Direct payments of $866
million were made to wheat and feed grain producers. Both the
wheat and feed grain reserve objectives were achieved by December
1978, with approximately 1.3 billion bushels in the reserve including
411 million bushels of wheat and 739 million bushels of corn.
There were only modest changes in the farm program for the 1979
crop year. They were: a 20 percent set-aside for wheat, and a 10
percent feed grain set-aside, with a 10 percent additional land diver-
sion for corn and sorghum and a 20 percent set-aside for barley.
Crops in 1979 were again at record levels, and exports set new
records in both volume and value. Crop prices remained strong,
periodically surpassing the grain reserve release price levels. Crop
receipts rose 20 percent, and net farm income increased 14 percent
over 1978, growing slightly faster than the general rate of inflation.
No deficiency payments were made for 1979 crops, except sorghum
and barley.
In the fall of 1979, given the expectation of a high level of foreign
and domestic demand and concern over inflation, the Secretary of
Agriculture announced no set-aside program for 1980.
As a result of the suspension of grain and oilseed sales to the
Soviet Union on January 4, 1980, several steps were taken to offset
some of the economic impacts of the embargo. Since the embargo
was for national security and foreign policy reasons, the 90 percent
of parity provision in the 1977 Act for an embargo based on domes-
tic considerations did not apply. The steps taken by the Carter
Administration included:
1. Assumption of export contracts held by grain companies for grain sold to
the Soviet Union beyond the 8 m.m.t. called for in the U.S.-USSR five-
year Grains Agreement.
2. Increase in loan rates, release prices, and call prices. 7
3. Additional incentives for grain to enter the farmer-owned reserve, i.e.,
increase storage payment and waiver of interest.
4. Purchase of wheat for an International Emergency Food reserve.
5. Additional Commodity Credit Corporation credit to finance export sales.
Although a paid feed grain diversion program was considered, it
was not implemented. During the spring, wheat and corn were pur-
chased by the CCC. The grain reserve was also briefly opened to
farmers who did not participate in the 1979 set-aside program.
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As new legislation is now being considered, the economic conse-
quences of the 1977 Act are continuing to occur. Hence, its impacts
are still not fully understood.
Background for the 1981 Legislation
Although there are several similarities in the present economic
events and those just prior to the passage of the 1977 Act, there are
also several notable differences. There have been two successive
record crop years, and grain stocks have grown. However, the farmer-
owned grain reserve has temporarily isolated some of this grain from
the market. In spite of an embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union,
agricultural exports have continued to grow. Food price increases,
while perhaps not as much of a concern to consumers as in the
mid-1970s, continue to rise at a fairly rapid rate.
The focus of the debate and the provisions of the 1981 food and
agriculture legislation will likely depend not only on the political
and economic conditions in the period just prior to its passage but
also on expectations about economic conditions through the mid-
1980s. The chapters that follow attempt to evaluate the economic
consequences of various policy alternatives under different assump-
tions about future economic conditions.
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NOTES
See the Statistical Appendix for detailed trend data and rates of change.
There were actual decreases in agricultural production in the U.S. in 1970
and 1974.
For a brief review of these initial legislative proposals see USDA-ESCS
(1977), Martin, and USDA-ESCS (1980).
For more complete detail on the provisions of the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1977 see Spitze, Johnson and Ericksen, Stucker and Boehm, and
Martin and Jones.
The Secretary may establish a minimum release level for wheat of not less
than 140 percent nor more than 160 percent of the loan rate. The Secre-
tary may select an appropriate release level for feed grains. Initially, the
Secretary selected release percentages of 140 and 125 percent of the loan
rate for wheat and feed grains, respectively. The release price for wheat
was raised to 150 on January 7, 1980.
The Secretary must set the call level for wheat at no less than 175 percent
of the loan rate. The call price for feed grains may be set at the discretion
of the Secretary. The initial call percentages were 175 and 140 percent
respectively. These percentages were raised to 185 and 145 percent re-
spectively on January 7, 1980.
The release level for feed grains was kept at 125 percent of the loan rate.
For wheat the release price was increased to 150 percent of the loan rate.
The call price for feed grains was increased to 145 percent of the loan
rate and to 185 percent of the loan rate for wheat.
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2 FARM PRICESAND INCOME
R.G.F. Spitze and Marshall A. Martin
Governments directly influence farm prices and income in nearly
every country in the world. In the United States various governmen-
tal farm price and income support programs have operated for nearly
50 years. 1 Programs in some form have been maintained since the
late 1920s for most grains, cotton, tobacco, oilseed crops, wool,
sugar, and milk. These commodities account for about half the cash
receipts of farmers in the United States.
The objective of this chapter is to provide a framework for analyz-
ing future alternative government policies that will influence farm
prices and income. This framework includes a discussion of the
characteristics of the problem, a review of relevant theoretical knowl-
edge, and a summary of empirical information. The chapter closes
with a brief evaluation of four policy alternatives.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROBLEM
Historically, the problem to which price and income policy has
been directed is characterized by unstable farm product prices, by
unstable farm income, and by lower farm family income as compared
|to other segments of the economy. These characteristics have paral-
led the very emergence of commercial agriculture. The problem has
often been overshadowed or changed in recent decades by the low
income problems of the 1930s, the relatively high farm prices of
the 1940s, and the government commodity programs of the 1950s
R.G.F. Spitze and Marshall A. Martin are professor of agricultural economics
and assistant professor of agricultural economics, University of Illinois and
Purdue University, respectively.
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and 1960s. Price and income instability reemerged as a major prob-
lem of agriculture in the 1970s (Robinson).
Farm Product and Input Price Variability
Instability in agriculture can arise from natural and societal sources.
It can also result from the interrelationships of these two influences,
such as the recent blight susceptibility of hybrid corn. Societal
sources of agricultural instability include: 1) business cycles, infla-
tion, and economic recession, 2) market structure and organization,
3) the nature of the supply and demand for agricultural commodities,
4) commodity cycles, and 5) other domestic and foreign policy
actions such as monetary policy, export embargoes, and exchange
rate manipulation.
Agricultural prices tend to be unstable in the aggregate as well as
at the level of individual commodity markets. The degree of instability
varies over time and among commodities. Farm prices tend to fluctu-
ate more than the prices of nonfarm goods and services due to
structural and behavioral differences between the two sectors. The
biological nature of agriculture often results in unanticipated gaps
between expected and actual production, which in turn create
dramatic price effects. In contrast, production in the industrial
sector can be more easily adjusted as market conditions change.
Organizationally, agriculture tends to be composed of many indi-
vidual producers who have no influence over product or input
prices. This atomistic characteristic coupled with the biological
production cycles for crops and livestock create unique price oscilla-
tions for most farmers. In the nonfarm sector there are often relatively
few firms producing a given product. Such a market structure gives
producers of nonfarm goods and services greater influence over the
prices consumers pay and the volume of goods and services provided.
This instability of farm product prices creates problems for
farmers, domestic consumers, exporters, businesses providing sup-
plies and services to farmers, and other firms and individuals who are
dependent upon the rural economy. Sharp price rises are welcomed
by farmers, their suppliers and the rural community; however, they
are disdained by consumers and exporters. Generally, falling com-
modity prices result in the opposite reactions. Hence, price variability
has built-in problems regardless of the direction of the swing. The
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severity of the reaction is closely related to the magnitude of the
price swings. The more commercial and dependent the producers
are upon purchased production inputs, the more obvious is the
financial impact on their operations.
The uncertainty associated with farm product price variability is
problematic since it adversely affects investment decisions in either
farm or farm-related businesses, alters the allocation of resources,
causes shifts in consumption expenditures, and hinders the develop-
ment of foreign markets. Relatively, price variability is less problem-
atic to those best informed and best able to bear price risk. Hence,
price instability may weed out less efficient farmers and encourage
larger operations capable of greater market power.
There are also problems with farm input costs. Prices paid by
farmers for their production inputs are largely and increasingly
determined in the nonfarm economy. Due to the organizational
and structural nature of the nonfarm sector, farm input prices
exhibit less variability than product prices.
Input price changes tend to lag behind changes in product prices
during both rises and declines. This characteristic becomes a serious
problem for farmers during product price declines because the more
stable input prices create a cost-price squeeze that can be both
sudden and severe. The opposite is true, of course, in periods of farm
commodity price increases.
Since purchased inputs are becoming a larger part of total farm
inputs, differences in farm price and cost movements lead to in-
creased stress on farm operators. Furthermore, many of these pur-
chased inputs are derived from petroleum, e.g., fuel, fertilizer, and
pesticides. This creates another vexing problem for the farmer since
petroleum price increases have far outpaced commodity price in-
creases in recent years.
Levels and Stability of Farm Family Income
Due to the variability of product prices as well as the underlying
variability of production, the farm income component of the total
farm family income stream remains unusually erratic (Houck).
However, the expanding off-farm component is generally quite
stable.
The instability of farm prices and income is due to the inelastic
nni
t
!
supply and demand for primary agricultural products. In an industrial
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economy such as the United States consumers spend a relatively
small share of their income on food. Hence, there is little change in
the quantity of food consumed even where there is a significant
change in food prices. Given the biological nature of agriculture,
the lags between production decisions and actual production changes,
and the competitive organization of farming, farmers are unable to
make rapid changes in aggregate production levels in response to ma-
jor changes in product prices.
The unstable nature of farm family income has major repercus-
sions for the farm family itself, farmers trying to enter the business,
the associated agricultural businesses, and the rural community.
For example, farmers with a high indebtedness can face bankruptcy
due to cash flow problems in a period of sharply lower commodity
prices and farm income. On the other hand, sudden actual or expec-
ted farm price and income increases can result in high asset values
as land values are bid up. In fact, for some farmers capital gains may
exceed current income.
In most industrial countries, including the United States, the
major rationale for government intervention in the production and
pricing of farm products, and for various income payments, has been
the improvement of the income and welfare of farmers, both abso-
lutely and relative to other economic sectors. Historically, with the
exception of 1973, per capita farm incomes in the United States have
lagged behind nonfarm incomes. It is commonly believed that, in
the absence of government intervention, farm prices and income
would fall to a point where farm families would suffer, more people
would be forced off the farm, rural-urban migration would increase,
and more rural towns would become economically depressed.
There are also pronounced differences in farm income levels be-
tween the producers of various commodities, between geographic
regions, and between farmers within a given region. These differ-
ences in the distribution of income are a result of differences in:
access to resources, educational levels, management skills, personal
values and beliefs, market imperfections, historic development pat-
terns, and certain public policies- and the vagaries of weather. Some
high-income farmers make returns comparable to, or higher than,
the highest in the urban sector of the economy. However, low
income farm families comprise a higher than proportional segment
of the poorest families in the total economy. Many farm families,
in order to earn an acceptable income level, must also seek employ-
ment in the nonfarm sector.
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THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE
As introduced previously, one major reason for the variability
of agricultural prices and incomes is the unique nature of the demand
for agricultural products. Both price and income elasticities of
demand for individual agricultural commodities and in the aggregate
are relatively inelastic. Hence, any change in the quantity demanded
leads to a proportionately greater change in price in the opposite
direction. Furthermore, in a high-income country like the United
States increases in per capita income result in only very little right-
ward shift (increase) in the demand for food.
The inelastic nature of the demand for farm products also holds
implications for farm income. When the quantity supplied decreases
without comparable changes in demand conditions, gross farm
income increases. Conversely, an increase in the quantity supplied
leads to a decrease in gross farm income. Consequently, economic
events that tend to reduce farm production, ceteris paribus, increase
farm prices and gross farm income (Tomek and Robinson).
Despite recent growth in foreign demand, which tends to be price
elastic for a particular country such as the United States, the total
demand for U.S. farm products appears to still be price inelastic
(Brandow, 1961; George and King). Furthermore, greater depen-
s hav| dence on foreign markets with few barriers to trade can contribute
to both increased domestic price and income variability, as changes
in uncontrollable demand or supply abroad are injected into the
competitive domestic market. U.S. export demand can vary due to
changes in world agricultural production, changes in exchange rates,
or decisions made by marketing boards or authorities in centrally
planned economies (Schuh).
The ultimate effect of such price variability is inefficient resource
allocation due to greater difficulties in formulating expected prices.
Hence, producers commit either too many or too few resources.
While initially felt by farmers, the instability of farm prices and
income rebounds through the agribusiness sector and rural commun-
ities, both of which depend upon the flow of income from agriculture.
Variability in farm commodity prices and income is also related
to the unique nature of agricultural product supply, the fixity of the
resource commitments, and the structure of input markets (Johnson;
Tweeten). The supply is inelastic within the production period,
which can vary from the growing season for some crops to several
years in the case of livestock. The perishability of many agricultural
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products also causes price oscillations during the marketing year.
Once farmers make an initial allocation of resources, it is difficult
if not impossible in the short run for them to shift resources from
one farm enterprise to another or entirely out of the agricultural
sector. This fixity of resources leads to slow adjustments in output
relative to changes in prices and related economic conditions. Hence,
the aggregate and individual agricultural product supply responses
tend to be quite inelastic with respect to price.
The implications of the unique nature of agricultural supply and
demand under its highly competitive conditions of production and
marketing are depicted in Figure 1. The farm firm is in equilibrium
with price (Pe ) and quantity of production (Qe ) and is just covering
all costs (C) but with no excess profits. If costs increase (AC to AC),
production falls (Qe to Q'). If the product price falls (Pe to Pi),
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Figure 1. Effects of Costs, Prices, and Technology on the Farm
Firm.
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i production falls (Qe to Qi). However, in both cases costs are greater
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than returns by (AB) and (DE), respectively, and there are losses in
farm income. Yet, the allocation of the fixed resources to farm pro-
duction is likely to continue as long as some returns above fixed
costs are realized, as is still the case even at price P]_. Agricultural
producers generally can not individually (due to absence of market
ipower) or collectively (due to numbers and diversity) directly alter
Isuch costs or prices to protect normal profit.
The problem of fixity of farm resources can also be depicted.
A very low price level (P2) with a level of production (Q2) would
not cover the variable costs nor even all the fixed costs (FCac)- But
assume (FCac) represents acquisition costs and that these resources
have a lower salvage value (FCSV ) if they are transferred out of farm-
ing. Thus, with a salvage value lower than the minimum threshhold
price (P2), production is likely to continue even at (Q2)- The impact
on resource returns and farm income is clear: the low price permits
only short-term survival; this production pattern can not continue
in the long run.
Farm product supply is also significantly affected by the flow of
technology. While a substantial amount of this technology is devel-
oped in the public sector, it is frequently further developed and
disseminated by the private sector.
In an effort to increase the profit margin per unit of production,
and thus net farm income, farmers adopt cost-saving and/or output
increasing technology. Early adopters benefit as they reduce pro-
duction costs with no changes in the product price. However, as
more and more farmers adopt the technology, aggregate production
increases (the product supply curve shifts to the right) and, ceteris
paribus, the product price, per unit profits, and gross and net farm
income decline. Production is likely to continue as long as variable
and fixed costs (at perceived salvage value levels) are covered. Given
inelastic product supply and demand, consumers benefit relative
to producers as the quantity of food increases and its real price de-
clines due to technological progress (Cochrane).
The economic impact of the adoption of new technology on
farmers and consumers can be illustrated diagrammatically (Figure 1.).
As new cost-lowering technology is injected into a competitive farm
sector, average production costs may fall to (ACt) with production
expanded to (Qt). This greater quantity of production in the midst
of the competitive forces is sure to reduce the product price (Pe to
perhaps Pi) and erase the temporary excess profits (FL). The com-
petition of the agricultural sectors generally prevents farmers from
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protecting profit levels. To the extent that other sectors of the econ-
omy operate at less than competitive conditions, a divergence between
|
their factor returns and family income compared to that of farm i
families is likely to persist. Although farm prices and income decline,
.
consumers have benefitted from a larger supply of food at a lower
price level.
One method historically used in farm commodity programs to*
increase farm prices and income is to reduce production. Acreage
allotments, set-aside programs, diversion payments, and marketing
quotas are policy instruments used to curtail production and, subse-
quently, increase farm prices and income. The factor of production
whose use has been restricted is land, and it is relatively fixed in
natural supply. As a result of this and other forces, land owners
have bid up the price of land.
The major beneficiaries of any such one-time capitalization are 1
the resource owners. Any time resources that are relatively inelastic
in supply are restricted this kind of capitalization occurs (Floyd).
Examples of beneficiaries of capitalization in the nonfarm sectors of
the economy include holders of: urban capital, franchises, profes-
sional accreditation, and labor union membership.
In agriculture, ownership of land and product sales are skewed,,
with a small proportion of owners and operators producing a much
larger proportion of the total product and income. Since most
commodity price and income programs have been tied to either land
or sales volume, their direct benefits have tended to be directly pro-
portional to size and sales classes; that is, larger farmers get more
benefits since they produce a larger volume (USDA-ESCS 1979;
Gardner; Spitze, Ray, Walter and West).
Until the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973,
most agricultural price policies relied on parity as the base of com-
parison. Since its inception in the 1920s, parity has generated much
emotional reaction, has proven highly controversial, and has been
carefully codified into technical meanings. As a policy instrument,
parity is that price for a unit of agricultural product that will cur-
rently give that unit the same purchasing power in the market for
farmer purchased goods and services as it had in 1910-1914, adjusted
for the relative price changes of that product compared to all farm
products over the past ten years. Parity focuses on the purchasing
power represented by price and not on volume of sales nor income
(Holland; Sharpies and Krenz). However, its aggregate concept,
parity ratio, closely parallels the trends in total real net farm income.
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As farm productivity has increased faster than that in the rest of
he economy, as outmigration has reduced the number of farm
amilies, and as off-farm income has increased, the parity ratio has
(become less useful as an indicator of the relative income of farm
families. However, the parity concept is still widely accepted by
any as a measure of equity for farm prices and income.
Cost of production has now largely replaced parity as the con-
ceptual basis for calculating price supports. Cost of production is
commodity specific and does reflect changes in technology and
|
input use. Furthermore, it focuses on current economic changes and
is similar to conceptual instruments that prevail in setting prices in
jthe nonfarm economy.
Production costs vary widely from farm to farm and from one
geographic region to the next. Climate, soil types, management
skills, size of operation, and other factors all influence production
costs. There are also conceptual problems in separating fixed and
'variable production costs (Martin; Pasour; Stovall and Hoover).
(Finally, any increased cost of production that is automatically built
tfofe into prices through public policy, similar to any increase in price
from the demand side, tends to be capitalized into the value of fixed
i factors of production such as land. Regional production costs could
*>e used in establishing prices through policy, but even then the land
values through capitalization would gradually adjust and reflect these
regional cost and target price differences.
Farm income levels vary among regions, farms, and commodities.
A multitude of policy instruments affect producers differently as to
commodity, region, size, and firm organization. They also affect
producers differently than consumers. More specifically, various farm
policy instruments can have different impacts among livestock pro-
ducers, crops producers, producers of export products, and producers
facing import competition. The desired combination of policy in-
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RECENT TREND DATA AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
The data for the past two decades presented in the Statistical
Appendix of this bulletin reveal quite clearly the characteristics of
the price and income problems identified earlier in this chapter. They
also substantiate the theoretical relationships just reviewed.
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Prices received by farmers have varied throughout the period,
with greatest instability since 1971. They have also oscillated more
than prices paid by farmers for goods and services—primarily from
the nonfarm sectors of the economy—more than consumer prices;
for food, and more than consumer prices paid for all items. Prices
received by livestock producers have also been more unstable than
those received by crops producers. The year-to-year variation >
appears related to yearly production variability and increasing de-
pendence upon foreign markets.
Aggregate real net farm income has been highly variable, doubling
from 1971 to 1973 and then dropping by 55 percent by 1976. This
variability has been due largely to price instability rather than vol-
ume of sales. The off-farm component of farm family income has
maintained a stable upward trend, leaving the income instability
largely a result of the farm sources. Total per capita income of the
farm population has gradually converged with that of the nonfarm
population. Both the upward trend in real aggregate net farm income
and its increasing instability appear associated with the increasing
role of the export market.
Additional important trends relevant to the price and income
problem are the increase in off-farm income, the increase in farm
size, the increase in proportion of total sales from the larger farms,
.{Continu
the increase in value of real physical assets, and the decrease in
aggregate real value of government payments to farmers. No discerni-
ble relationship appears between the declining role in total net
income from these government payments and farm productivity
trends.
Numerous econometric studies have been conducted to analyze
the various trends observed in farm prices and income over the last
several decades. These studies help provide a deeper understanding
of the fundamental behavioral relationships that underlie these
trends.
Of particular importance are econometric estimates of price elas-
ticities for the supply and demand for U.S. agriculture in the aggregate
as well as for selected agricultural commodities. Various studies have
verified the inelastic own-price and income elasticities of demand for
most agricultural commodities (Brandow 1961; George and King;
Nerlove and Addison; Tweeten).
One important new economic event that has influenced agricul-
tural demand elasticities in recent years has been the growing impor-
tance of international trade, especially in U.S. agricultural exports.
While there is some controversy about the exact magnitude of the
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export demand elasticities for those agricultural commodities pro-
f luced in the United States, it appears that the export demand
lasticities are greater than one (Schuh); that is, a change in price
8 vould result in a proportionally greater change in quantity of ex-
ftice )orts. Consequently, while the domestic demand elasticities have
hi ikely become more inelastic, this trend has been partially offset
" )y the growing importance of the export demand. However, the total
lemand for U.S. agricultural products is still quite price and income
nelastic.
ublin The price elasticity of supply for most crops produced in the
This Jnited States is generally between 0.1 and 0.4. For some livestock
:nan vol xroducts the own-price supply elasticities may be slightly larger but
ha ;till normally less than one (Tomek and Robinson). Sharp swings
: occur in farm prices and income when there are unusual shifts in
•tlhe supply and /or demand for agricultural commodities given their
- Inelastic nature.
SELECTED FUTURE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
:ea>:r
Continuation of the 1977 Act
in fan
tease ij
iscemi One policy alternative is the CONTINUATION of the basic policy
- )rovisions contained in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. This
X' analysis emphasizes the commodity provisions of the current legisla-
tion (Johnson and Ericksen; Stucker; Penn and Boehm).
analyJ
Provisions: A nonrecourse loan set approximately at or slightly
r."
1
: below world market levels, at the discretion of the Secretary of
Agriculture, would be available to eligible producers to provide
price stability during the marketing year. The farmer-owned grain
-
-> leserve program would provide a means of stabilizing farm prices
jegaK pver a three to five-year period. In times of excess supplies and lower
. v prices eligible farmers could use the nonrecourse loans and place
their grain in the reserve. As "free stocks" were reduced, market
^.•prices should rise. As market prices reach predetermined trigger
evels, farmers could begin to sell grain from the reserve. 2
To provide additional income protection to farmers against low
market prices and induce their compliance with any production con-
trol needed, the target price/deficiency payment concept would be
continued. Eligible farmers would receive a uniform deficiency pay-
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merit per unit of production when the average market price fell
below the target price. Target prices would be based on a two-year
moving average of national production costs, excluding land pur-
chase. 3 Additional protection against natural disasters in crop
production would be available either through continued disaster
payments, an expanded national crop insurance, or a combination!
of the two.
Farmer eligibility for program benefits would continue to be
based on participation in a set-aside program when the Secretary
deems some reduction in production is necessary to achieve a balance I
between expected demand and supply. If no set-aside is in effect,
all farmers would be eligible for program benefits.
Consequences: Continuing the 1977 Act would help stabilize grain
j
prices while permitting farmers to retain some control over their
r
marketing decisions. Prices would generally be stabilized at levels
slightly higher than under no policy. This level would be between!
the loan level and the call price level except in a situation of unusually
low grain production, e.g., an annual drop in U.S. production of oyen
15 percent, or world reduction of over 5 percent. The farmer-owned
reserve with penalty provisions at the higher price levels minimizes
the market impacts of government stocks being dumped suddenly
or of producers holding grain indefinitely during periods of growing
scarcity.
Farm income would generally be protected for crop producers |
from market prices falling below costs of production, other than land i
purchase costs, and from disaster due to natural catastrophe. Again,
these income levels would average higher than no policy. As a result,
the capitalization of this minimum income level into farmland prices
would prevent them from falling as low as they otherwise would in
the absence of public policy. The economic base of rural communi-
ties would be similarly protected.
A voluntary set-aside procedure gives farmers the flexibility to
make resource allocation decisions according to efficient production
criteria. The public experiences a balance between the supply and
demand for its agricultural goods at a more desirable price level than
would likely occur in the absence of such a public policy.
Treasury costs could be large, especially in periods of large crops.
Low market prices would imply sizable deficiency payments to
farmers plus the Treasury outlays associated with a nonrecourse
loan/grain reserve program. This tax burden could range between
minimal administrative costs in years of high farm product prices to
rtf
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four to six billion 1972 dollars or 1 percent of the total federal bud-
get in years of low product prices.
By keeping loan rates relatively low, growth in export sales and
the U.S. share of foreign markets would be protected. A grain
reserve program not only helps modify price variability but also
assures foreign buyers of reliable supplies in the event of short falls
in production and helps this nation to fulfill its foreign food aid
commitments.
Compensatory payments
Another policy alternative would involve Treasury payments to
farm producers when market prices fall below a predetermined tar-
.:'; get price level.
over the:
Provisions: This approach would set target prices for each com-
modity at a level that would result in farm income levels being no
lower than the minimum allowed under alternative CONTINUA-
TION. The target price would be set between the loan rate and target
price level followed under that alternative. Farmers would be paid
size the difference between the target price and the average national
market price for their volume of production. There would be no
acreage set-aside, marketing quota, or other controls on production.
1 Consequences: A compensatory payment plan would encouragefarmers to expand production above levels likely with no public
? Again policy and above those likely during low price periods under CON-
TINUATION. Farm product prices would likely vary more and fall
:' lower in periods of low prices under this COMPENSATORY alter-
wouldii native than would occur under either CONTINUATION or no public
ommuni policy. More resources would be held in the agricultural sector. Farm
income would vary within a range similar to CONTINUATION and
higher than the lowest levels under no policy.
Since this policy could be used for any product, the incomes of
producers of livestock and other perishable products could be pro-
tected as well as crop farmers. Also, the rural community and agri-
business would receive economic protection. A reduction in risk
due to the compensatory payments would likely lead to greater
specialization. Similar to CONTINUATION, land prices would be
held above the minimum likely with no policy.
Treasury outlays could be very high. This approach would be
potentially more costly than alternative CONTINUATION. They
level thai
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could range between minimal administrative costs and a high of
10 to 12 billion 1972 dollars or up to 2 percent of the federal budget
in periods of large production and plentiful world grain stocks.
Agricultural exports would be encouraged during periods of large
supply. This would help improve the balance of trade, pay for foreign
imports, and strengthen the dollar, but it also could encourage retali-
ation from foreign competitors. Export sales would likely average
higher than under either CONTINUATION or no policy.
Effective Production Control and Higher Price Support
A third possible policy for the farm price uid income problem is
to directly regulate the quantity produced and the price received—
the CONTROL alternative. This approach could be accomplished
through higher loan rates and effective production controls. Higher
and more stable farm product prices and farm income would then be
generated in the market at a level no less than that determined by the
loan rate. Two options of effective production control are possible:
compulsory, or voluntary.
Provisions of a Compulsory Option: Effective production control
with the COMPULSORY option would require mandated compliance
of all producers so that the aggregate quantity in any production
cycle would clear the market at an average price high enough to
provide a socially acceptable level of income for producers. To insure
that the average price would not drop below this desired price level
during the marketing year, a minimum price support through an
annual nonrecourse loan would be available at that level.
Consequences of Compulsory Option: In order to ensure an aver-
age level and stability of farm income approximating that of the
CONTINUATION and COMPENSATORY alternatives, stringent
mandatory production restrictions would be available at all times and
used periodically when large supply threatened the maintenance
of the desired price level. Aggregate farm production, particularly
crops, would likely be less than under CONTINUATION, and sub-
stantially less than under the COMPENSATORY alternative or no
public policy. All producers would participate in the production
balancing. Hence, there would be a reallocation of economic resources
and adjustments in marketing decisions. As a result, farm product
prices on the average would be slightly higher than under CONTIN-
si
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UATION, and much higher than under COMPENSATORY. They
would also average higher than under no public policy. Total farm
income would be targeted to be comparable to the previous two
alternatives, which would average higher and be more stable than in
the absence of a public price and income policy.
Treasury costs would be higher than under no policy, but they
would be lower than with the CONTINUATION alternative and
substantially lower than under COMPENSATORY. There would be
administrative costs to control and enforce the program. Also, there
would be Treasury costs incurred for the annual issuance and re-
demption of the stabilizing nonrecourse loan program. The total
icosts should not exceed one-two billion 1972 dollars in any year.
Trade would be substantially disturbed by this policy, compared
to the other policy alternatives, with the higher prices discouraging
exports unless costly export subsidies were tendered. Import pro-
tective measures would be necessary to avoid a significant inflow of
agricultural products. These policies could precipitate retaliation
from both trading partners and competitors.
Provisions of a Voluntary Option: The objectives of the CONTROL
alternative with the VOLUNTARY option are exactly the same as
with the above COMPULSORY option. That is, regulating or balanc-
ing the aggregate quantity in any production cycle would clear the
market at a socially desirable average market price to insure that the
price and income would average higher and be more stable than in
the absence of public policy. The important difference is that the
production control would be achieved through the voluntary com-
pliance of producers with sufficient volume to obtain the desired
price. Inducements to comply would be some form of Treasury
subsidies, probably either on a unit of product or on a unit of input,
most likely land. This inducement could be varied to meet the degree
and extent of participation needed for the production balancing.
A minimum price support through an annual nonrecourse loan to
stabilize the price during the marketing year would be available to
program participants.
Consequences of Voluntary Option: The consequences to pro-
ducers would very closely mirror those of the other option consid-
ered above with these differences: 1) slightly more acreages would
be restricted to account for the slippage always associated with the
voluntary approach as producers withhold their less productive
resources, 2) slightly less production would be withheld and a slight-
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ly lower average market price would be necessary to achieve the same
farm income objectives since payments cover some fixed costs and
eliminate the burden of some variable costs, and 3) producers would
have the flexibility to pursue economic decisions in their allocation
of resources and marketing decisions as they voluntarily chose
whether to participate in the production control.
Treasury costs would be much higher than the COMPULSORY
option because of the Treasury payments required in addition to the
administration of the production control and nonrecourse loan pro-
grams. They would be only slightly lower than the CONTINUATION
alternative where income supplementation is also involved. Outlays
would still be lower compared with COMPENSATORY.
Trade would be affected similarly to the previous option, except
that the marginally lower goal for the average market price would
result in marginally less interference in normal trade.
Multi-Purpose Policy—An Innovative Alternative
A fourth alternative for the price and income problems of agri-
culture would depart from the traditional policy utilized since its
inception in the late 1920s. This alternative encompasses additional
agricultural problems that have recently emerged, and it would merge
past policy instruments with new ones in response to broader public
concerns. This policy alternative would be designed specifically to
respond to three public problems: 1) balancing U. S. agricultural
production with demand to maintain prices at publicly desired levels,
and injecting a degree of price stability by means of "setting aside"
productive land and by a grains reserve program, 2) conserving agri-
cultural land against soil erosion, and 3) reducing pollution of water-
ways by nonpoint sediment sources from agricultural land to meet
minimum levels established by Environmental Protection Agency
guidelines to meet new public policy commitments.
Provisions: A national grains reserve policy, mirroring that under
the CONTINUATION alternative, would be operated to provide an
important part of the response to the problem of instability of farm
prices and income. Also, the level of production would be pro-
grammed to insure market prices similar to those envisioned in the
1977 Act, or the CONTINUATION alternative.
A voluntary set-aside would be induced, through sufficient public
payments, of land designated for its erosion-prone characteristics
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(e.g., slope, proximity to stream, soil type, etc.). After a national
goal of production set-aside is established, the total number of
required set-aside acres would be allocated among the most erosion-
prone acres.
Payments to land owners would be related to the productivity
and erosiveness of their land. Because of either its location (close to
a stream) or its quality (slope or structure), land with the highest
erosiveness might need to be set aside almost continuously to meet
minimum national sediment control standards. Additional payments
could be made to keep this land out of production or to help farmers
make the necessary investments to reduce soil erosion. Flexibility
would be permitted for most managerial economic decisions of re-
source allocation and marketing, except that sufficient inducements
would counteract what would otherwise be the private economic
decision to produce on land that would result in erosion and sedi-
mentation not in the public interest.
A combination of the slightly altered prices and substantial
payments would assure an income level similar to that envisioned
under CONTINUATION. The aggregate payments would exceed
those of the latter because of the need to induce set-aside of larger
acreages of some farms, thereby essentially destroying their econ-
omic viability, and because of the need to set aside larger acreages
vr. of relatively lower producing land to attain the desired production
control objectives.
Export and import controls would be minimal, similar to CON-
TINUATION, but sufficient to prevent significant decreases in the
former or increases in the latter.
A national agency such as the Soil Conservation Service would
be needed to provide the expertise required to establish and evaluate
the desired conservation and nonpoint sedimentation objectives.
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Consequences: Average levels and stability of both farm product
prices and farm income would be generally parallel to those achieved
under the CONTINUATION alternative. The primary differences
at the producer level would be the concentration of both the pro-
duction control and the changes in resource use in the crop areas
with most erosible land, or generally marginal production regions.
This situation contrasts with production control being pursued
throughout a type of farming area under either the CONTINUA-
TION or CONTROL alternative. It would mean that some land and
associated resources would shift out of agricultural production or
into alternative enterprises as the owners of those resources respond
Lat
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to the policy inducements. Adjacent rural communities would ex-
perience a declining economic base, an occurrence that could be
mitigated by recreational use and grazing of some of the diverted
land.
Consumer food prices and quantity would be quite similar to
those associated with CONTINUATION in terms of a planning
horizon of a generation, but could be more favorable in a longer
term societal horizon as some resources are conserved for future
generations.
The effects on trade would be identical to those of CONTINUA-
TION. Treasury costs primarily for inducement payments, but also i
for a more elaborate administrative system to serve the multiple
objective, would greatly exceed those of no public policy, CONTROL,
and even the CONTINUATION alternative, approaching the high
costs of the COMPENSATORY approach. However, unlike the
other costly alternatives, the public transfer payments would serve
to alleviate not only the price and income problems of farmers,
but also the public problems of erosion of productive land resources
and the nonpoint sedimentation of the public's waterways. Then, ,1 Pro
too, the costs of specific programs otherwise necessary to alleviate
those problems might be reduced or even avoided by this policy
alternative. Finally, externality costs of prevented soil erosion and
deterioration of rivers, lakes, and water structures could logically
be perceived as offsetting the high Treasury outlays.
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1. For excellent chronological and analytical overviews of these policies, see
Brandow (1977), and Rasmussen and Baker.
2. The evidence is not clear whether farmers have released grain from the re-
serve in the best interest of the public. Several trigger prices could be used
to smooth the release. One alternative would be a gradual reduction in
storage payments as market prices move above the release price. Another
could be three trigger prices: 1) a release price, 2) a price where storage
payments would be stopped, and 3) a call level.
3. To alleviate the fluctuations in target prices due to sharp annual changes
in yields, a trend yield over several years could be used instead of the
actual yield to calculate the cost of production per unit of output.
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AGRICULTURAL
POLICY AND
FOOD PRICES
M.C. Hallberg and T.A. Stucker
POLICY PROBLEM
The food price increases and fluctuations of the 1970s have been
a major concern to U.S. consumers. This concern has forced policy
makers to focus more sharply than probably at any time since World
War II on the general issue of food price instability and on the pro-
cess by which food prices are determined.
In the U.S. economy resources are allocated among alternative
uses primarily by relative prices. Changes in relative prices over time
are to be expected in response to changes in natural, technological,
and behavioral forces. Such price changes are not typically violent;
when they are violent, their effectiveness in guiding economic
choices tends to be impaired. Farmers, for example, have long sought
stable product prices in an effort to reduce the uncertainty that
makes production planning more difficult and more costly. Similarly,
consumers seek stable food prices in an effort to simplify and make
less costly the optimal budgeting of household expenditures. Rapidly
fluctuating food prices may, for example, lead to ad hoc purchase
decisions as substitutions are made within and among food categor-
ies, and as the portions of the budget spent on food and nonfood are
altered.
A second facet of the current policy problem is that prices of
food, like prices of other goods and services, are moving upward but
at differing rates. These changes are putting added pressure on
household decision makers regarding food purchases. Further, the
M.C. Hallberg and T.A. Stucker are professor of agricultural economics, The
Pennsylvania State University, and Section Leader, Food and Nutrition Policy
Research, National Economics Division, USDA-ESCS, respectively.
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changes have different impacts on different groups of consumers.
The purchasing power of the poor in particular is severely reduced.
The issues analyzed, then, concern what factors and policy actions
affect the rate of change of food prices and in what direction. The
purpose of this chapter is to examine these issues by considering
the interrelations between the farming, marketing, and retailing
sectors by studying recent trends in food prices and by examining
the impact of selected policy alternatives on food prices and con-
sumption.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
To understand and predict the nature of food price levels and
fluctuations it is helpful to conceptualize the underlying forces at
work. The basic raw material for food is, of course, provided by the
agricultural sector. This sector is extremely complex and difficult
to unravel. There are lagged responses to price changes induced by
biological constraints. These lagged responses in turn bring about
price and production cycles. Uncertainties and abrupt changes are
associated with weather and disease. Key interactions exist between
feed grain and livestock production. Finally there are significant
interrelations between the agricultural sector, the marketing sector,
and the consumer sector. This chapter is now directed to the essen-
tial character of the feed grain and livestock economy and to some of
the intersector interactions noted above.
Grain-Livestock Economy
Agricultural policy in the post World War II years has been directed
primarily at crops, including in particular wheat and feed grains.
Hence, this policy has had a direct impact on retail prices of food
made from these products—as well as an impact on the producers.
But since a substantial portion of these grains are fed to livestock
(45 percent in 1977), the policies have also had an indirect impact
on the retail prices of beef, hogs, sheep, poultry, eggs, and milk-
as well as an impact on the producers of these products.
Robinson calculated the following direct and indirect impacts on
U.S. consumers for all domestic grain use. These results are expressed
in 1973-1974 dollars per capita. The calculations assume grain price
increases of approximately $1 per bushel. These estimates assume an
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instantaneous and full adjustment of prices of foods made from grain
(the direct impacts) and of prices of meat, poultry, and dairy pro-
ducts (the indirect impacts). While instantaneous adjustment is not
likely in the real world, we would expect full adjustment to occur
over the long run.
Table 2. Annual Consumer Cost of One Dollar Grain Price Increase
Indirect
Direct through Livestock Total
Wheat $3.00 $ 0.80 $ 3.80
Feed Grains 2.68 29.00 31.68
Soybeans 2.04 2.62 4.66
$7.72 $32.42 $40.14
Source: Robinson
Clearly, the indirect impacts of agricultural policy aimed at grain
prices or production must not be ignored. The total effect on the
consumer through livestock is almost six times larger than the direct
impacts alone. This relationship suggests that livestock producers,
as well as consumers, have an interest in any policy that affects
grain prices.
Marketing Margins, Farm Prices, and Retail Prices
The primary or retail demand for food products is a joint demand
for the farm-based and marketing-based (marketing service) com-
ponents of these products. Hence the demand for the farm-based
components of food products is derived from the retail demand.
Derived demand can be obtained by appropriately accounting for
the costs of marketing services added to the farm produce. These
costs are designated collectively as the marketing margin.
A hypothetical primary demand schedule (Dr ) and derived de-
mand schedule (Df) are shown in Figure 2. It is assumed that the
supply of marketing services is perfectly elastic, so the marketing
margin (MM), defined as the difference between the retail price of
the commodity and the farm price of the farm produce used, is con-
stant at all levels of quantity demanded.
By a similar line of reasoning, retail supply is a joint supply of
the farm-based and marketing-based components of food products.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium Prices at Farm and Retail Levels.
Retail supply can thus be considered derived from farm supply. A
diagrammatic farm-level supply schedule (Sf) and a derived retail-
level supply schedule (Sr ) are also shown.
These theoretical relationships provide the necessary framework
for studying the impact of marketing margin changes on farm and
retail prices (Freeman). Equilibrium farm price (Pf) is given by the
intersection of derived demand and primary supply, and equilibrium
retail price (Pr ) is given by the intersection of primary demand and
derived supply. An increase in the marketing margin, which would
be reflected in a downward shift of the derived demand schedule
(D'f) and in a leftward shift of the derived supply schedule (Sr ),
would result in an increase in retail price (Pr), a decrease in the
farm price (Pf), and in a decrease in quantity consumed (Q). A de-
crease in the marketing margin would have the opposite effect.
Note in Figure 2 that when marketing margins change, the entire
amount of the change can not be expected to be reflected in the
retail price, except in the unlikely case of a horizontal supply curve.
On the other hand, when supply is perfectly inelastic, which is a
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fairly reasonable assumption for agriculture in the short run, the
entire burden of an increase in the marketing margin can be expected
to fall on farmers' prices. In general, the incidence of changes in the
marketing margin is seen to be dependent upon the relative slopes
of the demand and supply curves. Since supply of farm products
is generally considered more price inelastic than demand in the
short run, the incidence of a given change in the marketing margin
can be expected to be greater at the farm than at the retail level
(Tomek and Robinson).
Some cautions with this theoretical framework should be ob-
served. First, the above analysis is predicated on the assumption that
marketing margin increases or decreases are due to increases or de-
creases in the cost of providing a given bundle of marketing services.
If marketing margins change because the quantity and/or quality
of marketing services change, the primary or retail-level demand
function can be expected to shift since the primary demand function
is a joint demand for the farm product and the marketing services.
The most recent attempt to estimate the quantity of marketing
services used data from 1929 to 1962 (Waldorf). The trends observed
in Waldorf's work, irrespective of its date, are consistent with the
currently held view that, with increased affluence, more working
wives, etc., consumers are now demanding and receiving more mar-
keting services. The effect of this trend has most likely been an
upward (to the right) shift in the primary demand curve with little
or no impact on the position of the derived demand curve and hence
on farm prices. There have, however, been changes in costs of pro-
viding a given and constant bundle of marketing services in recent
years, so the position of the derived demand curve has shifted, and
hence the level of farm as well as retail prices has been impacted.
Second, the above analysis also assumes that marketing agents
are perfectly competitive, that there are no lags in the transmission
of price changes at different levels of the producing-processing-
marketing chain, and that there are no economies or diseconomies
of scale in marketing. Recent research raises questions about these
r)i assumptions. The work of Parker and Connor, for example, points
w
\
strongly to the existence of noncompetitive behavior in food manu-
: facture and provides estimates of the consumer costs of monopoly
excesses. Recent evidence also suggests that marketing margins
respond to changes in farm prices with some lag (Heien, Benson,
Parham). Although this is a short-run phenomenon, its effect ac-
cumulates. Hence, the impact of a large price increase at the farm
level in one year, such as occurred in 1973, is not fully transmitted
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through the system until at least the subsequent year. Finally, evi-
dence exists that marketing margins for some commodities vary with
volume marketed (Buse and Brandow). Recent results confirming
this behavior are discussed later.
One final limitation of the analysis is its partial-equilibrium frame-
work. It does not consider substitutions or complementarities among
commodities on either the demand or the supply side. It also ignores
interrelations with the rest of the economy and with the rest off
the world.
FOOD PRICE TRENDS AND
RELEVANT EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
Food Prices and Inflation
Estimates of the contribution of retail food price increases to in-
flation over the 1960-1979 period are presented in Table 3. These
estimates mask some important factors such as the contribution of
individual food items, the increasing importance of away-from-home
eating, and the recent volatility of prices of imported foods and fish.
Nevertheless, the data suggest that, with the exception of 1973 when
farm prices increased by 43 percent, food has been no greater a con-
tributor to inflation during the turbulent 1970s than it was during
the relatively tranquil 1960s.
Price increases at the farm level contribute much less to inflation
than do increases in the marketing margins for food items (Table 4).
Although food items constitute about 18 percent of the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), the farm value of these food items accounts for
only about 6 percent of the CPI. The remaining 12 percent of food's
contribution is accounted for by the marketing sector. Thus it is
clear, as Robinson has observed, that what happens in the food
marketing sector is likely to have more impact on inflation than
policy changes affecting farm prices.
n
Variability of Farm and Food Prices
Retail prices, farm values, and marketing margins for food pro-
ducts were decidedly more volatile in the late 1960s and in the 1970s
than in the early 1960s (Statistical Appendix Tables 6, 7, 18, 19, 20).
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Typically, farm values of food exhibit greater variability than do
retail prices of food. The volatility of marketing margins for most
foods is comparable to that of retail prices. Notable exceptions to
this rule are found with broilers, eggs, and fats and oils.
Contrary to some expectations, the above food price variations
did not result in compensating adjustments in per capita consump-
tion (and hence an increased variability of per capita consumption of
food products) during the 1970s. There have, however, certainly
been changes in per capita consumption since the early 1960s. Per
capita consumption of eggs, pork, dairy products, coffee, veal, and
mutton has declined noticeably, while that of broilers, beef, fruit,
and vegetables has increased. Nevertheless, the coefficients of varia-
tion computed for annual per capita consumption were remarkably
stable over the entire 1960-1977 period.
Vlarketing Margins, Food Prices, and Farm Prices: A Model
To provide more specific detail on the market relationships, an
empirical model of the food and agricultural sector is useful. To
provide some indication of the magnitudes of the impacts of a few
relevant exogenous variables on farm and retail prices, adaptations
were made in a basic and simplified feed-livestock model developed
by Prindle. Other quantitative models do not include all of the inter-
relationships of relevance to this topic.
The Prindle model was designed to estimate: equilibrium prices
and quantities of beef, veal, pork, mutton, broilers, turkeys, eggs,
and milk; equilibrium numbers of beef cattle placed in feedlots;
and equilibrium prices of corn and soybean meal. Exogenous varia-
bles of the model included the quantity of high- and low-protein
feeds available for livestock consumption, disposable income of
consumers, and imports of each of the meats. The equations of the
model included demand for low- and high-protein feed, livestock-
grain price equilibrium or animal product supply relations, derived
demand relations for each of the meats, for eggs, and for milk, and
appropriate accounting identities. The model was estimated from
annual data over the period 1961-1971 and utilized to make simula-
tions for the 1967-1971 base period.
In adapting the Prindle model for use here, the derived demand
relations were replaced with primary demand functions (obtained
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from George and King), marketing margin relations were added 1 , and
all remaining relations were updated to the 1977 base period.
Thus modified, the model not only produces equilibrium farm
prices, but also equilibrium retail prices of meats, eggs, and dairy
products. It recognizes substitutions on both the demand and supply
side and accounts for the relevant interactions between the farming
and marketing sectors. It can be interpreted as a reasonable quanti-
tative representation of the major economic relationships at work
in the feed grain and livestock portion of the farm and food sector
of importance here.
Only a few selected relations of the model will be noted. Marketing
margins for some products do vary with quantity marketed. Mar-
keting margins for pork were found to be negatively related to the
quantity of pork processed, while marketing margins for eggs were
found to be positively related to the quantity of eggs marketed. The
pork results suggest that there exist economies of scale in the pro-
vision of pork marketing services. The egg results are less easily
explained, but they seem to imply that egg marketers raise and lower
the marketing margin in an effort to moderate retail price fluctuations.
The numerical results from the solution of the model confirm
some of the theoretical relations discussed earlier (Table 5). The
results support the theory that as marketing costs increase, farm
prices fall and retail prices rise. There are exceptions to this rule,
e.g., the impact of wage rate increases on retail prices of turkeys,
eggs, and dairy products. This exception can be explained by the
substitution effects on the demand side outweighing the effects of
increased wages on the retail prices of certain products.
The magnitudes of the coefficients in the table also indicate that
a reduction in the costs of marketing and processing, i.e., in the
marketing margin, will likely be accompanied by fairly large reduc-
tions in food prices and increases in farm product prices. Wage rate
reductions appear to have a greater impact on farm and retail prices
than do reductions in other marketing costs. Nevertheless, policies
directed at reducing nonwage marketing costs can also be expected
to have important payoffs to both consumers and farmers.
Finally, the coefficients also confirm that impacts of shifts in the
derived demand curve are generally greater on farm prices than on
retail prices (note in particular column 2). This same phenomenon
takes place as the primary demand curve shifts due to increases in
disposable income (column 1).
cfl
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CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Continuation of the 1977 Act
Because of the price support and production control features oft
the 1977 Act, retail prices of grain products can be expected to be
somewhat higher under this CONTINUATION alternative than if
no program existed. Since feed grain prices are maintained above
equilibrium levels, farm and retail prices for livestock products would
be higher than under no program. This in turn means that per capital
consumption of these products is reduced, and the nutritional intake
of some consumers is reduced. The relative increase in food prices
associated with this policy would be greater under conditions off
heavy supplies, e.g., exceptionally favorable weather, as production
controls come into play. Fluctuations about a likely upward trend
in food prices due to rising production costs, however, should not
exceed levels observed during the last half of the 1970s, due in large
part to the grain reserve features. There should be less price varia-
bility than under no program.
Finally, this program will continue to serve the low income con-
sumers better than would occur in the absence of the food subsi-
dization provisions of the 1977 Act.
Treasury costs of this program are not exorbitant, nor are they
insignificant. They would be higher in periods of heavy supplies. In
1978 government payments to farmers amounted to $13.86 per
U.S. resident, i.e., 1.2 percent of per capita consumption expendi-
tures on food. Total government cost of implementing all provisions
of the 1977 Act was probably twice this amount. These costs are,
of course, borne by federal taxpaying farmers as well as by taxpaying
consumers. Given that only about 4 percent of the population in
the United States live on farms, there was in 1978 an important
transfer of income from nonfarm people to farm people, amounting
to over 1 percent of total federal expenditures, in order to imple-
ment the food and agricultural policies of the 1977 Act.
Compensatory Payments
Under this alternative, farm prices would be permitted to seek
their equilibrium levels, which would be, on average, lower than
under CONTINUATION and lower than even under no policy.
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onsumers would thus enjoy lower prices and greater consumption
3f cereals, meat, eggs, and dairy products. Low income families
would have access to a more nutritious diet for the same total outlay
or food.
Consumers may also be expected to benefit from the COMPEN-
SATORY alternative in that lower prices of agricultural products
would permit freer movement of agricultural products in interna-
tional trade. Freer trade could result, for instance, in a substantial
reduction in import controls on red meat, dairy products, and
Doultry products. Such reductions may, in turn, provide the United
tates greater leverage in negotiating for freer trade of industrial
products attractive to U.S. consumers.
It is likely that food prices would be somewhat more unstable
ander this alternative than under CONTINUATION because of the
absence of any price stabilization mechanism. It would take dramatic
natural phenomena, however, to induce price variations of the mag-
litude observed in the early 1970s.
The Treasury costs of implementing this policy alternative would
ikely be higher than those associated with the CONTINUATION
alternative. This is particularly true if the policy provides for sup-
Dorting the incomes of livestock and fresh fruit and vegetable pro-
ducers as well as the income of grain producers. Thus, there would
3e offsetting costs to federal taxpaying consumers. It is doubtful,
lowever, that the added Treasury costs would outweigh the consumer
Denefits mentioned above, particularly to those with lower incomes.
Since this alternative would permit direct support of the incomes
Df livestock and poultry producers, it would encourage expansion
}f these sectors. These sectors would likely experience increased
demand as incomes rise (Sisler). The COMPENSATORY alternative
ilso should add more stability to these sectors than would exist in
:he absence of any policy.
Effective Production Control and Higher Price Support
The use of either compulsory or voluntary production controls
jives policy makers more leverage in achieving farm price and income
*oals at lower Treasury cost than under the previous two alterna-
tives. Nevertheless, the CONTROL alternative means higher market
trices for farm products and thus higher food prices than would
?xist under the CONTINUATION or COMPENSATORY alternative.
58 Hallberg and Stucker
For the reasons indicated in the earlier section on the grain-
livestock economy, the retail cost of livestock and poultry products
will be significantly enhanced under this alternative. Let us assume,
for example, that feed grain prices are increased by 50 cents per
bushel under this alternative. This increase in farm prices could be
expected to result in an annual increase (in 1973-1974 prices) in
consumer expenditures of $1.34 per capita through purchases ofi
food products made from feed grains and of $14.50 per capita
through purchases of livestock and poultry products.
Low income consumers are likely to be most seriously disadvan-
taged by the CONTROL alternative as a result of the higher cost of
food and particularly of the higher cost of livestock and poultry
products. Some of the pressure on this class of consumers would
be relieved, however, if a food subsidization provision were made.
Retail prices of grain products could be expected to be somewhat
more stable under this alternative than under either the CONTINUA-
TION or COMPENSATORY alternative. The variability of retail
prices of livestock and poultry products would also be more stable.
In contrast to the expected results of the COMPENSATORY
alternative, consumers can also be expected to be disadvantaged
from the added restrictions on movement of agricultural products
in international trade. The Treasury cost of CONTROL would likely
be lower than that of the previous two alternatives.
Payments and Workable Competition—An Innovative Alternative
This alternative encompasses all of the features of the COMPEN-
SATORY alternative. In addition, it provides for the institution ofj
means designed to enhance workable competition and to reduce
excessive costs in the food marketing sector. The latter might take
the form of a professionally staffed federal public commission em-
powered to: 1) monitor the food industry for monopoly excesses
and incidences of unworkable competition, 2) subpoena information
needed and to conduct or commission basic and applied research
relevant to changing the structure of the food industry, and 3) recom-
mend actions designed to counteract or limit excessive or misleading
advertising, to restrict mergers, to discourage firm growth, to en-
courage firm entry (both corporate and cooperative), and to eliminate
regulations that are unnecessarily restrictive or that encourage
inefficiencies.
The "workable competition" portion of this policy alternative
could, of course, be combined with CONTINUATION or CONTROL
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It was combined with the COMPENSATORY alternative here be-
lt cause the latter also emphasizes "free market" operations.
The policy alternative conceived here could serve a variety of
objectives in addition to that of lowering the cost of food to con-
sumers. These include: 1) serving the equity goal of supporting the
incomes of livestock and poultry producers as well as of grain pro-
ducers, 2) eliminating monopoly excesses or government regulations
in food marketing that do not promote efficiency, 3) assisting in
providing farmers full access to better performing markets, and
4) more fully integrating farm and food issues into national foodw
to and agricultural legislation.
The commodity policy objectives of this alternative would result
in all of the consequences of the COMPENSATORY alternative.
Eliminating possible "monopoly excesses" in food marketing means
ower marketing margins. As previously shown, lower marketing
margins can, in general, be expected to be accompanied by lower
retail prices and higher farm prices. Parker and Connor estimate
that "monopoly excesses" in food processing amounted to 5-6
Dercent of food consumption expenditures in 1975. If even one-
half of this estimate could be eliminated by the means suggested,
significant impacts on food prices could be expected. Quite impor-
tantly, greater impacts on retail prices could be obtained from these
savings than from comparable percentage reductions in farm prices
brought about by policy actions.
Encouraging entry of marketing and processing firms, perhaps
along with divestiture of some existing marketing and processing
I) firms, would be expected also to locate markets in certain areas of
(
jfche country currently disadvantaged by having no markets or inade-
quately performing markets. If these new markets prevented costly
long-distance shipment of food products, marketing margins would
be lowered, thus benefiting consumers as well as producers.
NOTES
L. The marketing margin relations used were of the form:
Pr = a + biW + b2Q + b3T + D4Pf
where Pr = retail price
W = wage rate index
Q = quantity of product marketed
T =time
Pf = farm price
60 Hallberg and Stucker
In these relations Q produced a coefficient that was significantly different from
zero only for pork and eggs; W produced a coefficient that was significantly dif-
ferent from zero in beef, veal, pork, mutton, broilers, and eggs; and T produced
a coefficient that was significantly different from zero and negative for beef,
mutton, eggs, evaporated milk, and frozen products but positive for turkeys
and cheese.
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AGRICULTURAL
TRADE POLICY
ISSUES
Alex F. McCalla
The importance of the international market to the U.S. agricul-
tural sector increased substantially in the 1970s. This increase is
vividly portrayed by the growth of net agricultural trade as a percent
of gross farm income from 3 percent in the early 1960s to 12 percent
in the late 1970s. There is every indication that agricultural trade
will be as important, if not more so, in the 1980s. Thus, trade policy
issues will be important in the formulation of food and agricultural
legislation in 1981 and beyond. In this chapter the nature of the
public policy issues related to agricultural trade are outlined. Analyses
of interfaces between domestic policy and the international market
are often difficult because of inadequacies in the theoretical and
empirical models. These issues are reviewed before a discussion of a
limited set of public policy alternatives is presented.
PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM
Most countries pursue price and income policies to protect domes-
tic agriculture from instability and to provide minimum income
maintenance. The United States is no exception. For more than 40
years the United States has accumulated an increasingly complex
set of price and income policy measures to serve these purposes for
the agricultural sector. The pursuit of domestic support policies is
much more complex when there is more than a marginal involvement
in international markets. This is so because some management of
Alex F. McCalla is professor of agricultural economics, University of California,
Davis.
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the international interface is necessary to prevent events in inter-
national markets from overturning domestic objectives. The issue
becomes even more complex if the nation is both an exporter andi
an importer.
On one hand, a developed country exporter seeks to expand or at
least maintain exports. As a result, farm income is enhanced in the
face of nearly static domestic demand and rising farm costs. This
leads the United States, when wearing an exporter hat (grains, oil-
seeds, and some fruits and vegetables), to adopt a "freer trade"
stance on these commodities to expand export opportunities. Simi-
larly, the United States takes a free trade stance on commodities
it does not produce (e.g., tropical beverages, spices, and other assorted
tropical products).
However, there are other circumstances in which the United States
is either both an exporter and importer (e.g., cotton, tobacco, wine,,
and processed fruits and vegetables) or an importer (e.g., dairy pro-
ducts, beef, sugar) where management of competitive imports is
necessary to prevent disruption of domestic programs. This situation
leads to an essentially "protectionist" position on these commodities.
These various policy positions lead the United States into a neomer-
cantilist stance of simultaneously seeking to expand exports and
manage imports.
Thus, the first major policy problem is clear. Trade dramatizes
the often inconsistent objectives of a nation as it tries to implement
complex domestic policies in the international context. This is not
a new problem, nor is it likely to disappear. It is, however, exacer-
bated as the export market becomes increasingly important to the
United States.
If only one country were trying to accomplish domestic stability
by exporting instability, the international market could serve to
cushion internal fluctuations. But almost every country is doing the
same thing. It has great similarity to the "beggar-my-neighbor"
monetary and trade policies of the 1930s. A world market consisting
of uncoordinated, policy-induced residuals is inherently more un-
stable than a free trade market. It also makes unilateral movements
toward freer trade irrational because on the export side this places
the freer trade nation in the position of a residual supplier absorbing
the brunt of international fluctuations in supply and demand. As
long as nations continue to pursue inward-looking domestic agri-
cultural policies that use the international market as a safety valve,
this problem will persist. The U.S. position is more complicated
because the United States is both an importer and an exporter.
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But agricultural policy has a second set of problem interfaces.
These are the interrelationships between agricultural and general
trc economic and diplomatic policy. A few examples will demonstrate
the issues. While U.S. agricultural imports in constant dollars grew
at an annual rate of 3 percent from 1960 to 1979, U.S. agricultural
exports grew at an annual rate of 6 percent. 1 In the same period
THk total U.S. agricultural production grew at an annual rate of 1.8
percent. Thus, the net trade balance in agriculture has changed from
a deficit in the 1950s to a large surplus in the late 1970s. This growth
in the net agricultural trade surplus (about 11 percent per year in
constant 1972 dollars) has made an important contribution to the
overall U.S. balance of trade, which has steadily worsened as the
price of petroleum and other imports have increased. Consequently,
agriculture has become an important element of national trade policy.
The use of export controls to accomplish domestic and/or diplomatic
objectives has significant impacts on other dimensions of agricultural
policy. The soybean embargos applied to control domestic inflation
in 1973 and 1975 are examples of the former, while the recent USSR
grain embargo is an example of the latter.
A third problem is that monetary and exchange rate policies now
impact on agriculture through the international interface to a greater
extent. Exchange rate fluctuations have differential impacts on
commodities; for example, feed grains go mainly to developed coun-
tries and wheat goes mainly to less developed countries. Given that
many commodities are produced in specific regions, there are regional
impacts of trade policies. Also, the increased dependence of U.S.
agriculture on purchased inputs, many of which have import com-
ponents, causes costs to rise as the value of the dollar declines. In
general, the increased internationalization of agriculture raises a
large number of macro-economic policy issues (Schuh).
Finally, agricultural product demand expansion programs such as
food stamps have international counterparts in Public Law 480.
But food aid also can be considered as a component of foreign
assistance policy. Here the conflict between short-run export expan-
sion programs and longer-term development assistance programs
remains. A rational longer-term assistance program would include
expanding imports of raw, semi-processed food and agricultural
products from less developed countries to allow them to earn foreign
exchange with which to buy, for example, grain. But such a policy
has severe regional impacts (e.g., Mexican vegetables) from the
redistribution of income from import competitive sectors to export
sectors and may simultaneously make income maintenance programs
or a
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for commodities such as sugar, tobacco, and fruits and vegetables
more expensive.
These issues are sufficient to illustrate the increasing complexities^
of agricultural trade policy in the four interfaces noted, namely:
1) domestic price and income policy, 2) national economic policy,
3) monetary and exchange rate policies, and 4) diplomatic and for-
eign assistance policy. However, these are all relatively short-run
issues.
There are also some crucial longer-term issues that must be
addressed. First, is a policy that emphasizes continuous expansion i:
of exports in the long-run best interest of the United States, oris?
there a point where resource degradation and environmental impacts
become so costly as to render the net cost of larger exports greater
than the benefits?
Second, what is the long-run comparative advantage of U.S. agri-
culture? It is curious that a technologically-advanced, capital-
intensive agriculture exports land-intensive products (grains and
oilseeds) and imports more capital- and input-intensive products non-tanfi
(meat and processed products).
Third, what ought to be U.S. policy towards the developing
countries? Should the United States, via technical assistance and
high international prices, encourage domestic food grain production
in less developed countries? This would be contrary to past implicit
policy, which appeared to foster import dependence through low
prices and concessional sales.
A fourth question is related to international pricing of exports.
Should the United States be pursuing a policy of pricing its export
products at higher levels to take advantage of the relatively more
inelastic foreign demand created by variable levies and similar policy
distortions in importing countries?
Fifth, what should be the trade negotiating stance of the United
States with respect to agriculture? Should bilateral and limited
theory
multilateral agreements be considered along with the cartel notion,
theorv
since the multilateral trade approach may have gone about as far as [^
it can go? tm ;
Finally, should the United States recognize that world markets ^
are "managed" by domestic policy makers in most countries either
by direct policy intervention (the variable levy in the European
Community) or by state trading organizations (e.g., the Canadian
Wheat Board)? The basic policy question is whether the United
States by adhering to private marketing channels places U.S. farmers
and consumers at a disadvantage relative to other trading nations.
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r No matter how offensive philosophically some of these longer-run
questions may be to some, they need to be raised as trade policy
proceeds into the 1980s.
namely
c pole;
and fcfl RELEVANT THEORETICAL TRADE MODELS
hort-mT
The dominant theoretical model used in trade analysis has been
the Heckscher-Ohlin general equilibrium model. This model, based
on notions of comparative advantage and differential factor endow-
ments, can be used to demonstrated the gains from trade and to
determine equilibrium conditions (Houck and Pollak; Schmitz).
The elegance of this model, which is used to demonstrate the welfare
superiority of free trade, depends heavily on assumptions of perfect
- competition. Variants of this model are used in analyzing agricultural
trade, despite the fact that these markets are extensively distorted
i"
ductioa
mplxi
by: 1 ) protectionist domestic policies, (e.g., variable levies, quotas,
non-tariff restrictions (NTR's) and state trading), 2) private sector
concentration (e.g., the grain trade), and 3) various other factors
h isuch as trading blocs, exporter associations, and commodity agree-
ments.
Often trade analysts extend the formal free trade model to make
prescriptive pronouncements about the goodness of free trade as
a policy objective. Yet, as many authors, including Harry Johnson
and Richard Caves, point out, the empirical reality of world markets
suggest that imperfect competition theory may be more appropriate.
Hillman has clearly shown that agricultural trade is greatly influenced
by non-tariff barriers. Yet, very few attempts have been made to
apply any other than the competitive model. Most of these attempts
involved the application of monopoly theory. Virtually no oligo-
polistic approach yields satisfactory results (McCalla). The basic
theoretical difficulty is that of integrating general equilibrium trade
theory with partial equilibrium imperfect competition theory.
Unfortunately, the competitive model when used in agricultural
trade analysis has serious deficiencies.
Introducing distortions such as taxes and subsidies into competi-
tive models moves us closer to reality, but the additions still do
not allow us to deal with the discontinuities introduced by quanti-
tative restrictions and government policy. However, the model is
useful in conceptually understanding potential impacts. Diagramatic
representations of the gains from trade and the impact of policy
distortions are useful but complex.2
011OII
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Empirical analysis of trade policy issues has historically been much;
less voluminous than domestic policy analysis and has taken many
distinct forms. Only some general examples are reviewed here. The
most frequent approach to empirical analysis of the interface between
domestic policy and the international market has been to append an
international sector to a model of U.S. agriculture. Much recent
work involving aggregate programming and simulation models ol>
U.S. agriculture has included parametric estimates of international
demand. Often, several levels are investigated to test the sensitivity^
of domestic prices and production to hypothesized international
scenarios. These approaches, while useful in investigating the poteni
tial domestic impact of changes in international markets, do not in
capture the structure and price formation mechanisms in inters
national markets (Reynolds, Heady, and Mitchell).
A second class of analytical approaches involves world trade
models of country and/or regional supply and demand relationships,
These approaches produce net export supply and net import demand
functions that are aggregated to project a market clearing price and
net exports and imports of each participant. The USDA-GOL model
is an example (Rojko et al. ). These approaches may be useful for long-
run projections of gross trade activity but lack the dynamics to deal
with year to year changes as a result of policy or other shocks.
More recent work in direct estimation of net trade functions that'
include policy variables seems promising conceptually. However, the
statistical results have not stood up to rigorous tests of significance
(Abbot). Efforts to build dynamic simulation models of world trade
are limited. The Michigan State model (Mitchell) is a start, but i"tss|estimates
regions are so aggregate that it is difficult to look at particular coun
try impacts. This deficiency is not inherent in the conceptual model.
,
Rather it comes about from the massive costs involved in data
collection and analysis, as well as from difficulties in dealing with
exchange rate changes, inflation, and domestic policy changes.
None of the models reviewed above pretend to deal with the
analysis of actual trade flows. They are essentially price formation
models. The class of approaches that attempts both includes spatial
equilibrium models of world trade, usually using a programming
framework. Because of the nature of the models, these attempts Jk^ ij
usually yield distorted trading patterns while, at times, doing reason
able jobs of projecting prices. 2fj.
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Another class of approaches has focused on attempting to capture
tie reality of trade flows by introducing constraints to flows in terms
>f historic connections, preferential agreements, and the like (Grennes,
ohnson, and Thursby). However, general models that capture reality
n terms of flows seem to do badly in terms of price analysis. The
onverse is also true, namely, models capable of reasonable price
' inalyses either do not consider trade matrices or yield improbable
Estimates. This is probably the case because price formation is heavily
hfluenced by a small number of large traders. However, trade flows
nvolve all traders and are influenced by many factors beyond mini-
num cost transportation considerations. Therefore, it is unlikely
hat one model will do both well. 3
In sum, models of international markets leave much to be desired
n terms of capturing actual price and/or flow behavior in markets.
'-' part of the difficulty is due to the empirical models being based on
4narket clearing, competitive price determination models, which
issume structure to be constant. Thus, it is extremely difficult to
include structural and price distortions introduced by government
)olicies, state trading, and private sector concentration. Yet alter-
bi lative approaches, using oligopoly theory, which attempt to capture
Htructural reality, in terms of policy interventions and public and
orivate middlemen with market power, are extremely difficult to
estimate. Therefore they yield few, if any, insights into price forma-
ion (McCalla).
These approaches are further complicated by the fact that empiri-
' :al estimates of crucial parameters, such as the import elasticity of
x iemand, range from to well over -6.0 for the same country de-
> Dending on the assumptions and methodology used. Further, these
estimates vary from country to country, from commodity to com-
'" nodity, and from time period to time period. In addition, most
i ire based on data for the 1950s and 1960s when there was much
ess variation than in recent periods. Thus, in the international
'phere there is no convergence on major empirical parameters com-
Ifoarable to domestic aggregate supply and demand elasticities.
Finally, none of the trade models seem able to deal in a dynamic
sense with structural changes in terms of trade flows. For example,
the international wheat market has shifted from a market previously
dominated by developed country importers such as Europe and
Japan. It is now a market where less developed countries take 60
percent of the exports, centrally planned (pre-USSR boycott) take
20-25 percent, and the developed countries take less than 20 percent
hi
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on a gross trade basis or less than 10 percent on a net trade basis. u
e;p;
Similarly, the importance of centrally planned and high-income, ^ (
less developed countries in the feed grain and oilseeds markets has f
increased significantly. These trends not only alter the composition
and direction of trade flows, but, more importantly, they alter the
character of domestic policies that influence the nature of policy
induced residuals. For example, state traders are involved on at least
one side of virtually all international wheat transactions (McCalla i
;
L
he ,
and Schmitz). Thus, what is needed are new conceptual and empiri-
cal approaches to trade modeling to allow rational analysis of domes-
tic policy alternatives.
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ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS
This section explores the consequences of the three common
policy scenarios outlined earlier in this publication plus a fourth
dealing with managed trade.
provisior
coupled
i rising v
Continuation of the 1977 Act
Continuation of the provisions of the 1977 Act would not alter
the general "neo-mercantilist" position of the United States of
encouraging greater trade in exportables and managing competitive
imports to protect domestic producers. The trade implications of
such a policy are dependent on two interconnected sets of variables.
The first set consists of policies pursued by importing countries and
by exporting competitors. For this analysis it is assumed that the
less developed countries continue to pursue low consumer price
programs, which discourage production. Therefore, imports, par-
ticularly of grain, could be expected to rise. The major constraint to
import expansion would be foreign exchange earnings, which in turn
are influenced by developed country policy towards imports from
less developed countries. Similarly, if the centrally planned economies
continue to pursue policies of expanded availability of livestock pro-
ducts, demand for grains should remain strong. In this instance the
USSR grain embargo becomes critical in the longer run. It is also
assumed that major exporters continue to pursue current policies
of using U.S. prices as reference prices and behaving as if the United
States is the residual supplier.
markets
ordp
Compe
The
Treasi
comp
Agricultural Trade Policy Issues 69
These policies in conjunction with the CONTINUATION scenario
>utlined earlier for the United States should result in world prices
emaining above loan rates. Trade flows would occur at world prices
argely determined in the U.S. market. Export subsidies would be
inlikely provided that U.S. policy was successful in setting loan
•ates at "world prices." Target prices indexed to production costs
:ould cause U.S. production to continue to increase with the United
states becoming increasingly dependent on world markets and there-
fore subject more to global instability created by natural or policy
nduced shocks. The magnitude of these shocks could be ameliorated
oy the national grain reserve program.
If world prices fell as a result of favorable weather and world
production increases, the existence of a reserve would cushion the
impact in the short run. In the long run, set-aside production control
provisions could be used. Alternatively, if, as some argue, we have
experienced unusually favorable global crop production conditions
pver the past five years, then a return to more "normal" conditions
coupled with the incessant rate of population increase could portend
rising world prices. Rising world prices would induce increased pres-
sure on domestic prices, which could in turn lead to pressure for
anti-inflationary measures such as embargoes on exports.
In sum, the CONTINUATION alternative should not yield an inter-
national posture materially different than implied by the trends of
the 1970s. These trends include increased dependence on export
markets, potential instability, a set-aside program, and manageable
stocks through the farmer-owned reserve system. This analysis
presupposes, of course, no major shocks in terms of crop conditions
or diplomatic events.
Compensatory Producer Payments
The outcome of the scenario for exported crops would be not
unlike the CONTINUATION alternative. Exports would be encour-
aged by the slightly lower market prices. Furthermore, the discon-
tinuance of the farmer-owned grain reserve would serve to depress
prices in the short run, leading to both increased exports and increased
Treasury costs in terms of direct payments. To the extent that target
prices were below 1977 Act prices, these impacts would be less
severe.
This scenario would have much greater impacts on producers of
competitive imports. The scenario implies the abolition of interven-
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tion both in the domestic market (supply control) and in imports.
The implications of this policy for sugar, tobacco, dairy, and meat
markets could be substantial. Producer incomes would be protected
via the direct compensatory payments, which would lead to an in-
crease in domestic production. This increase coupled with increased
imports would substantially depress domestic prices, leading to some
increase in domestic consumption and substantial increases in the
direct cost of income support to the U.S. Treasury.
The assumption of composite prices similar to the present ones
would minimize production readjustment. However, if increases
in production were large, which in turn lead to adjustments in rela-
tive internal prices, the resulting internal production adjustments
would have strong regional implications as, for example, in sugar.
In sum, the scenario involves relatively little change for exported
commodities relative to the CONTINUATION alternative, but it
entails substantial changes on the side of import competitive pro-
ducers. The general impact would be to lower world prices, increasing
the cost of income maintenance via direct payments.
Effective Production Control and Higher Price Support
The international implications of such a policy are relatively
straightforward. In the short run such a high price support policy
would necessitate export subsidies on exportables and require
increased restrictions on imports either in terms of increased tariffs
or more quantitative restrictions on competitive imports. Given
the current U.S. trade surplus on the agriculture account, there
would be an increase in the Treasury costs of the export subsidies.
In the longer run, if U.S. supply controls were effective and suf-
ficiently severe to reduce supplies available for export substantially,
world prices would rise given the dominance of the U.S. in temperate
zone commodity markets. However, such a policy of restriction
would in essence return the United States to a position of holding
a price umbrella over world markets, which would induce competi-
tive exporters to increase production. This set of circumstances
would be not unlike the late 1950s and early 1960s when the U.S.
market share of the wheat market decreased.
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nternational Management of Trade—An Innovative Alternative
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Description and Provisions. From the present situation in domestic-
international policy relationships one can move one of two ways:
towards unilateral free trade or towards a more managed world agri-
cultural trade regime. The former is essentially the COMPENSATORY
option. The latter is focused on international management of agricul-
tural trade. This second scenario would recognize that national
governments are going to continue to support farmers' incomes
through domestic programs that will require, as a necessary adjunct,
the management of trade relations. For example, this management
could involve the exporters recognizing the European Community's
i (EC) variable levy as an instrument of domestic policy rather than a
pure trade restrictive device. Given domestic programs, the question
is how best to organize the international market to accomplish parti-
cipant objectives. This approach of negotiated international policy
could take two directions. First, exporters and importers could form
a common set of agreements. In simplest terms, these could take the
form of multilateral commodity agreements or more complex multi-
lateral, multiple commodity conventions. However, international
agreements of this sort do not have an extensive history of "successes."
Therefore our innovative variant concentrates on trade management
initiated by exporters.
The wheat-feed-grains-oilseed trade dominates temperate zone
international agricultural markets. Given U.S. dominance in these
markets, any exporter arrangement would have to involve the United
States. Therefore, two variants are explored. The first would have
the United States joining other exporters to form a grain exporter
association (called the "cartel" variant) to enhance foreign exchange
i earnings. Several factors suggest this variant is possible. First, sub-
stantial monopoly surpluses exist in importing countries that pursue
protective policies that isolate internal farm prices from world prices
at high levels (e.g., EC and Japan). Second, the world grain trade is
dominated by four exporters, two of which (Canada and Australia)
already have in place institutional arrangements usable in a cartel.
Third, theoretically consistent market share and retaliation rules
J exist that can enforce cartel discipline. If, for example, a price
discriminating cartel were formed that sold primarily to developed
and centrally planned countries at high prices and sold the remainder
in a residual market consisting of the domestic market and low
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income, less developed countries, there seems to be substantial
possibilities for increasing foreign exchange earnings. This approach *
would mean lower domestic grain and, therefore, livestock prices. *
Returns from an export levy could be returned to farmers in return i
for supply management via direct payments.
A second possibility would be for the United States alone to
manage export earnings. This could be accomplished by a series off
bilateral agreements with major importers (e.g., the U.S.-Soviet grain il 1. F°rmo
agreement) and is, therefore, called the "bilateral" variant. In the ;i ft
feed grain and soybean markets U.S. dominance is so large that it
could almost perform as a monopolist using the threat of increased
prices to encourage major importers to sign long-term bilateral
agreements that would assure continuation of U.S. market shares.
Bilaterals are often criticized because they create instability in the
residual markets not covered by the agreements. However, it is not
clear that if the major exporters and importers were covered in bilat-
erals such instability would necessarily occur.
Consequences. The consequences of such an approach (or ap-
proaches) for U.S. agricultural policy are relatively clear cut. If
enhanced international prices (either from a cartel or a set bilateral
agreement) were passed directly to domestic producers and consumers,
substantial increases in domestic farm prices and food costs, as well
as increases in domestic production, could be anticipated. This
situation would require strong domestic supply control. It also
would create difficulties for livestock producers and consumers.
However, the price discriminating model alleviates most of these
internal problems. Such a policy would, however, be at variance
with long standing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
rules, which the United States has, in general, followed.
There also are a set of questions regarding the reactions of: 1) im-
porters and 2) nonmember exporters to increased international
prices. In both instances one could anticipate attempts to expand
production by assuring higher prices to domestic producers. However,
for importers increased self-sufficiency is probably increasingly
expensive. Note, for example, continuing European concerns about
the costs of the existing Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). On the
export side, if most major producers were members of the cartel,
the question is not likely critical because potential exporters of grain
and soybeans are not numerous.
The United States for many years has either held a price umbrella
over world markets or performed as a price-taking residual supplier.
,
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Although this particular innovative alternative approach is not being
advocated, a more aggressive policy is suggested to be worthy of
:areful analysis in the upcoming policy discussion.
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jL. For more detail see the Statistical Appendix, Tables 1, 14, and 15.
I p. The reader is referred to the excellent presentation by Jones and Thompson.
5. A recent paper by Thompson contains an excellent review of empirical
approaches.
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5
STRUCTURAL
CHANGES
N FARMING
Bruce Gardner
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
Several different and sometimes ill-defined issues have been raised
by farmers, agricultural economists, or political leaders as "structural"
problems. What makes them public policy problems is a perception
that they involve trends in the economic organization of agriculture
that will, if unchecked, adversely affect the interests of farmers, con-
sumers, or the general public. While a wide range of public policies
icould be used to influence the structure of agriculture, this analysis
concentrates on the connections between structure and farm com-
modity policy as encompassed in the Food and Agriculture Act of
1977.
Policies concerning credit, research and extension, taxation, or
the regulation of agriculture, which are probably more important
than commodity programs in determining structure, are only briefly
discussed. Realistically, any policies directed at structural change in
the 1981 agricultural and food legislation will probably be couched
in terms of special provisions in the commodity programs rather than
changes in tax laws, credit programs, or the direction of research.
THEORETICAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Two related but distinct areas of structural change in farming have
caused concern. The first pertains to the marketing of farm products,
the second to the economic organization of agricultural production.
Bruce Gardner is professor of agricultural economics, Texas A & M University.
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The structure of the marketing industries has long been seen as an
economic threat to both consumers and farmers because of the
market power of middlemen as compared to farmers. The newer
marketing concerns result from the linkages between farms and the ?|ii
imperfectly competitive marketing sector. One issue here is a trend
toward replacement of auction markets by forward contracting,
formula pricing, or other devices that reduce the role of publicly
quoted bids and offers in establishing market price. Another issue is incm
collective action by farmers, often by means of marketing coopera-
tives, to increase their market power. While these issues have been
discussed by agricultural economists, there is no consensus about the
quantitative, and in some cases even the qualitative, effects of these
marketing trends on the economic welfare of consumers, farmers,
and middlemen. However, these marketing issues are not central to
the prospective 1981 food and agricultural legislation.
The issues about the structure of farm production units stressed
by Secretary Bergland and others constitute the second major area
of concern. The most commonly cited potential problem related to
structural change is the concentration of agricultural production, r
The best relevant data are the estimates of number of farms by value
of-sales classes published annually in USDA's Farm Income Statistics.
Unfortunately, the declining value of the dollar coupled with fixed
nominal sales-class boundaries makes it difficult to determine trends
from these data.
A meaningful way to use these data is with a Lorenz curve, plotting,
cumulative percentages of farm numbers starting from the smallest.
In Figure 3 the curve for 1978 shows that the smallest 40 percent!
J
of U.S. farms accounted for a little less than 2 percent of sales, which i
implies that the largest 60 percent of farms accounted for 98 percent
of sales. These curves for four years reveal a substantial trend toward
increasing concentration since 1940. In that year, the smallest 40
percent of farms was roughly four times as important as they are
today in relative terms, accounting for 8 percent of sales. Similarly,
the largest 20 percent of farms has increased in relative importance
from about 64 percent of sales in 1940 to 80 percent in 1978. Other
contrasts of this type can be read from the Lorenz curves shown. If
these data included farm products used on the home farm as well as
sales, the trend in concentration would be still more dramatic. This
is because home-used commodities are less concentrated on larger
farms and have become a smaller share of farm output over time.
Increasing concentration, as represented by more curvature in
the Lorenz curve, is a phenomenon quite distinct from simply de-
•
20
Source
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ceasing numbers and increasing average size of farms. The reduction
iy half since 1950 in the number of farmers in the United States
nd the more than doubling of their average size does not imply
icreasing concentration. Indeed, if the farms that cease to be come
redominantly from the smaller sales classes and are absorbed into
ther small farms, then a declining number of farmers would tend
o reduce concentration. Similarly, if all remaining farms were
icreasing in size and at the same rate, then their relative shares of
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Sources: USDA-ESCS. Farm Income Statistics. Stat. Bull. 627,
Oct. 1979, and U.S. Department of Commerce. Census
of Agriculture. 1940.
Figure 3. Concentration of Cash Receipts.
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output would be constant and their Lorenz curve would remain
unchanged.
It is clear, then, that the increasing concentration of agricultural
production is not simply the result of declining farm numbers and
increasing average farm size. What is the explanation for this trend?
There have been many contributing factors. The nature of technical
change in farm production, and its interaction with risk and the
managerial skills of farmers, is probably important. Changes in the
product and input markets, such as reductions in the relative prices
of inputs more intensively used in large-scale production, likely
played a role. Developments in the farm real estate markets, especially
with general inflation and a tax code favoring capital gains, seems to
have encouraged farmland investment by nonfarm people. This real
estate trend made it more difficult for the moderate-sized, fully
owned family farms to compete. There is no definitive research that
isolates the relative importance of various exogenous influences on
the economic organization of agriculture.
WHY IS THERE A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM?
Concentration in and of itself is a structural problem that merits
public attention when it leads to suboptimal industry performance.
Thus, concentration leads to legitimate anti-trust concerns in many
industries. But in agriculture, apart from a few minor commodities,
there are still thousands of producers, not an oligopoly. While some
have raised the spectre of price-gouging corporations in control of
the nation's food supply, this does not seem to be likely in the fore-
seeable future. The issue of competitiveness in marketing seems more
pertinent. Under marketing orders, it is conceivable that thousands
of producers could attain quasi-cartel status. However, this is not a
likely area of imminent policy development.
The broader concern about structural change seems to stem not
from increased concentration per se, but from the institutional
forms it takes. Fewer and larger farms are less likely to be family
farms in the traditional sense. That is, less of the labor will be sup-
plied by the farm operator and family, more of the land will be
owned by nonfarm residents, less of the capital for investment will
come from internally generated farm funds, and the operator's
managerial role may be diluted or even usurped. In certain segments
of animal agriculture these trends have already caused dramatic
change. While these trends are disturbing to many people, this does
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not imply that policy steps to prevent them would be best for the
country. At the same time, it seems likely that some past policies
have influenced these trends, and that future policy alternatives have
structural implications that should be assessed and discussed.
RELEVANT EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
On the broad issues of the causes of structural change in both
U.S. agricultural marketing and production, and on the narrower
questions of the effects of particular policies, the existing evidence
is weak. The best available surveys of the state of our knowledge
about structure include Schertz et al., USDA 1979a Congressional
Budget Office, North Central Policy Education Committee, and
Western Regional Research Committee W-104. The results and con-
jectures in these surveys rest on a very thin empirical and analytical
base. Virtually the only relevant primary research has been aimed
at investigating economies of scale or size in farming (Carter and
Dean; Madden and Partenheimer; Quance and Tweeten; Hall and
LeVeen; Miller). Work on net returns by sales class, such as by Hottel
and Reinsel, suggests that larger farm operations have greater advan-
tages in returns to equity than declining average cost curves can
account for. These studies, as a group, suggest that some but by no
means all of the growth in farm size is a consequence of increasing
returns to scale in production processes.
Research stemming from the work of Schuh on the farm labor
market, from Sjaastad on off-farm migration, and recent research
on schooling, productivity, and off-farm work (e.g., Huffman; Welch;
Wallace and Hoover) has contributed to the beginnings of an under-
standing of structural change resulting from investment in human
capital and adjustment in labor markets. But these studies, together
with the research on economies of size, have not yet generated ade-
quate explanations of observed changes in sales-class or land-owner-
ship concentration, or other aspects of observed change in the
economic organization of agriculture.
The research problems in assessing the structural effects of par-
ticular government policies and programs are more straightforward.
The tax code, for example, spells out a set of tax rates, exemptions,
and other rules whose structural consequences are in some cases
apparent. Nonetheless, severe difficulties arise in trying to assess the
overall effect of the tax system (Sisson, USDA 1979b). Some agri-
cultural credit programs have explicit provisions for eligibility that
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are related to size, but again the net effects on the economic organi-
zation of the farm sector are not readily inferable.
In all attempts to estimate the consequences of policy intervention,
two very difficult but crucial problems arise. First, it must be specified
to which situation the policy in question is being compared. The
effects of the current income and inheritance tax laws have been
said to increase concentration. Compared to what alternative? A
steeply progressive tax system? A proportional tax? No tax? Second,
after deciding on the alternative with which to compare current
policies, how can the alternative effects on the structure of agri-
culture be judged?
Despite these difficulties, there have been many attempts by
researchers to assess the structural effects of commodity price-
support programs. The literature that contains the most detailed
empirical work pertains to the income distributional consequences
(Robinson; Bonnen; Schultze; Lidman; Gardner and Hoover; USDA-
ESCS 1979c). The general finding is that the programs have increased
the inequality of the distribution of income in agriculture. However,
it requires further analysis and empirical work to assess whether
changes in the economic organization of the farm sector have resulted
from this redistribution.
It has been argued, for example, by Quance and Tweeten and by
Penn and Boehm, that price support programs can be expected to
increase the average size and concentration of farm production units.
One reason advanced is that high price supports generate windfall
gains for large producers relative to smaller, higher-cost producers.
These gains are claimed to allow larger producers to outbid smaller
producers for land, presumably because high product prices increase
the rental value of land more in large production units than in small
production units. However, in most standard analytical models,
optimal size of a competitive firm (minimum of average-cost func-
tion) is independent of product prices. Moreover, it leaves unanswered
how the small, high-cost producers could continue in operation
without high price supports.
A second argument traces structural effects of farm programs
through the reduction of price risk. Pope and Gardner discuss three
ways in which policies that reduce risk can increase farm size:
1) increased output by risk-averse producers with given factor and
product prices, 2) increased input supply by factor owners, and
3) encouragement of adoption of decreasing-cost technologies. In
addition, risk reduction under a given technology has been hypo-
thesized to induce increased specialization. This hypothesis includes
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pecialization in farm enterprises as well as specialization in com-
mercial agriculture as opposed to a mix of on- and off-farm work
oy the operator. That the ratio of net family income to gross receipts
becomes smaller with larger-scale operations means that risk increases
with size, ceteris paribus. Price stabilization by means of commodity
programs reduces the risk in moving to a larger-scale, specialized
operation and might therefore encourage such shifts.
Nelson and Cochrane estimated that the average farm size increased
between 1953 and 1972 because of the farm commodity programs.
However, it is not clear that structural effects of farm programs can
be isolated statistically in their model. Thus, it must be concluded
that empirical research has not yet established definitively any
relationship between commodity programs and changes in the
structure of U.S. agricultural production. There seems to be more
disagreement among researchers on the status of this relationship
than on any other issue in structural change. Some believe that
commodity programs are among the most potent sources of past
'and current structural change in agriculture, while others emphati-
cally maintain that this hypothesized relationship has not been
substantiated. It seems likely that past programs have had some
effect on structure, even though the magnitudes cannot be precisely
estimated. Further, it seems clear that any policy will have some
structural consequences, and that the pending 1981 legislation could
be designed to have substantial planned structural effects.
thn
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POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Continuation of the 1977 Act
The 1977 Act continued payment limitations at about the same
minimal level of effectiveness as the 1973 Act. This is virtually the
only structurally directed feature of current commodity programs.
It has been estimated that of 750,000 participants in 1978 com-
modity programs, 1,184 producers (0.2 percent) were affected by
the limit of $40,000 for wheat, feed grains, and cotton combined
payments, and the limit of $52,250 for rice. Payments foregone be-
cause of the limitations were estimated at $25 million (1.4 percent
of total payments under the programs), or about $20,000 for each
affected producer (USDA-ESCS, 1979c, p. 37).
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Continuation of the same general approach in future policy would
continue to place a penalty on the very largest operations. But
overall it would not have an important impact on structural change.
However, the effect would be increased if support prices were set I
substantially higher relative to market prices than they have been i
under the 1977 Act. For commodities other than the grains and
cotton, there would continue to be no explicit structural provision
in the commodity policy.
The effects of the continued level of payment limitations on
consumers, taxpayers, and producers, other than those few directly
limited in payments received, would be negligible.
The (
structure
Compensatory Payments
adverse
product
adverse
With a payment limitation, this approach would have essentially
the same structural impact as the CONTINUATION alternative. With
no payment limitations, this approach would provide incentives for
large operators to expand and to specialize in response to the guaran-
teed producer price level. However, the guarantee would also enable
small-scale and part-time operations to stay in business if they
desired. It would operate analogously to the protection that import
tariffs provide for high-cost domestic producers or to the effects
on structure of higher prices from rising export demand. The net
effects on the structure of agriculture are not predictable.
It is possible that guaranteed returns above normal market-clearing
levels would promote the growth of both very large, specialized farm
operations and exceptionally small, high-cost farming. The farms
at each end of the size distribution would gain relative to medium-
sized farms, whose advantage from achieving moderate scale econo-
mies coupled with minimal risks of specialization and leverage are
made less valuable by the program.
Effective Production Control and Higher Price Support
This policy approach could be administered so as to have substan-
tial structural consequences. The prototype of such a policy could be
the tobacco program, which has contributed more to the perpetuation
of smaller-scale operations than for any other important farm
commodity. This was accomplished by tying rights to produce and
market tobacco historically to small plots. Some consolidation
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7
orpayr
Mivi
be adj
wasde
The
to be
famir
msec
irrigat
Thf
affect
mStructural Changes in Farming 83
and growth of tobacco operations has been permitted by limited
(within county) lease and transfer provisions. Under a similar ap-
proach for other commodities, rights to produce could be
administered to achieve almost any desired structural effects.
The consequences for producers and consumers of imposing
structural change by means of allocating rights to produce would
depend on the particular approach taken. Limiting allotments to
small farms would reduce the size of farm operations. But with
diseconomies of size and regional inflexibility such an approach
would increase production costs and could easily have substantial
adverse effects on consumers through higher food prices. Making
production rights negotiable or fully transferable would reduce such
adverse consumer costs. While both approaches would influence
structure, the income distribution impacts would differ.
Price Supports Designed to Alter Structure—An Innovative Alternative
The most practical means to tailor commodity programs to
structural goals is to establish differential graduated support prices
or payments levels based on size of the farm operation. For example,
each producer might receive a 25 percent bonus payment on the
first $5,000 of deficiency payments for the sum of all crops grown
(an individual crop-by-crop approach would encourage wasteful
diversification among crop enterprises). This initial payment might
be coupled with a 10 percent bonus on the next $5,000, followed
by no bonus and an upper total payment limit, e.g., $25,000. Such
an approach would provide an implicit subsidy to smaller-scale
relative to larger-scale farming. The degree of the differential could
be adjusted to achieve whatever penalty to large-scale production
was desired.
The wisdom of aiming commodity programs at structural goals
depends on the tradeoffs between efficiency in producing and mar-
keting the nation's food and fiber and the social goals that are believed
to be furthered by smaller-scale farming. Moreover, if smaller-scale
farming is to be promoted, it may be more efficient to do so through
other policies, e.g., tax policy, than by means of commodity pro-
grams. Also, noncommodity farm policy, such as the recently dis-
cussed limitation of 160 acres to be eligible for federally subsidized
irrigation water, could also be considered.
The commodity program approach to the structural problem can
affect only the producers of products for which the programs are an
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important determinant of the producer's economic success, and this
may apply to only a minority of farm production under future farm
programs. Generally, the scientific basis for social engineering of
farm structure is too unreliable to support optimism about successful
achievement of such legislative goals.
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GRAIN RESERVE
POLICIES IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD
Willard W. Cochrane, Marshall A. Martin, and R.G.F. Spitze
POLICY PROBLEM
Do the citizens of the United States want a publicly-operated
grain reserve program with the capacity to even out grain supplies
and stabilize grain prices over time? The answer to that question is
by no means clear as of mid-1980. The majority of grain farmers
want a price floor under their products but no form of a price ceiling
over their products. Grain traders and processors have expressed a
wide range of views regarding the desirability of attempting to stabil-
ize grain prices, but most have voiced opposition to the establishment
of a major governmental program—a reserve stock policy—designed
to stabilize grain prices in the marketplace. Livestock producers
generally favor stable grain prices, but they are less sure of the
desirability of overt governmental actions via a grain reserve program
to stabilize those prices. Consumers are always opposed to increases
in the price of food, but they often fail to see the relationship between
the operation of a grain reserve program and food price stability.
Support for a grain reserve program among consumer groups ranges
from strong to weak. Thus, there are currently varying forms of, and
degrees of, interest in a governmentally-operated grain reserve pro-
gram, but no clear public consensus either for or against such a
program.
Administration leaders and congressional leaders who share a
responsibility for stabilizing farm and food prices to both consumers
Willard W. Cochrane is professor of agricultural economics, University of Min-
nesota, Marshall A. Martin is assistant professor of agricultural economics,
Purdue University, and R.G.F. Spitze is professor of agricultural economics,
University of Illinois.
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and producers have shown considerable interest in a grain reserve
program. This interest is evidenced by the establishment of the
limited farmer-owned grain reserve program under the Food anc
Agricultural Act of 1977. This particular program is not a complete
j
stabilization program nor is it a commitment to stabilize grain prices
within any defined range. The program is viewed by administratior
leaders as a means of contributing to increased price stabilization
but in no sense guaranteeing it.
If the sole objective of the public policy were to stabilize domestic
grain prices within some defined range, this could be easily achieved
by regulating exports, and there would be no need for a grain reserve
program. No grain reserve would be needed because this nation ex^,
ports a large share of its grain production. However, the United
States does have other economic objectives. First, it is highly desirous,
of being recognized as a dependable supplier of grain to its regular
customers. Second, it is desirous of maintaining an international
system of trade that is as free as possible. Third, it is desirous of
contributing to the stabilization of international grain markets;
certainly it does not want to contribute to their destabilization.
Fourth, it is committed to helping the very poor nations of the world
meet their basic food needs.
Considering those objectives, the United States must think in
terms of a grain reserve program, or some set of institutional arrange-
ments, that has the capacity to even out supplies through time and
thereby stabilize world grain prices. This goal could be achieved by
the United States operating unilaterally a grain reserve program thati
has the capacity to stabilize world prices, by supporting a centralized
international grain reserve program managed by some international
agency, or by participating in an international network of coordi-
nated national grain reserve programs. And some combination of the
above approaches to world grain price stabilization might be given
a trial, as will be suggested in the final section of this chapter. But
given the varied economic objectives of the United States, as outlined
above, it appears to be inappropriate, even unproductive, to consider
the establishment of a national grain reserve that has the goal of
stabilizing domestic grain prices alone.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
As Houck and Ryan state in their survey of grain reserve studies,
the theoretical literature dealing with commodity price stabilization
'l: ill
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is wide, deep, and growing. This theoretical work has been surveyed
recently by Burnstein and in chapters in the same book by Turnovsky,
Sarris and Taylor, and Smith. Burmeister provides useful overviews
and summaries of this literature. But, based on the theoretical litera-
ture, no clear, unambiguous understanding exists about the cases
to be made either for or against deliberate efforts on the part of
some public agency to stabilize the prices of a product. Waugh
(1944), employing the concept of consumers' surplus, demonstrated
that consumer welfare increases when the price of a single commod-
ity fluctuates as compared with what happens when the price of the
commodity is stabilized at its arithmetic mean. Oi, using the concept
of producers' surplus, later demonstrated that producers too would
experience economic gains from price instability. Massel integrated
the Waugh and Oi results in a model containing both consumers and
producers and reached the conclusion that a society would reap posi-
tive welfare gains from the stabilization of the price of a single
product if compensation between consumers and producers is
feasible and does occur. Samuelson (1972) is critical of almost every
aspect of the Waugh and Oi approaches.
Turnovsky, Shalit, and Schmitz move away from a strict consum-
ers' surplus approach and toward a more general utility approach.
Their approach maintains that the more price inelastic the product
demand, the more of the consumer's budget spent on the product,
and the greater the consumer risk aversion for the product, then the
greater will be the welfare gains to consumers from product price
stabilization, and vice versa. Hence, when these conditions are met,
it may be deduced that consumers generally would gain from the
stabilization of food prices. Thus, a theoretical underpinning is, at
long last, being constructed which contributes to an understanding
of general price stabilization for the food sector.
In summary, numerous perceptive questions have been raised with
regard to the applicability of this theoretical literature to the resolu-
tion of urgent policy problems. The welfare analyses cited (with the
possible exception of Turnovsky, Shalit, and Schmitz) are of limited
use in solving policy problems. This is becuase they employ partial
equilibrium analysis, which assumes perfectly competitive markets,
perfect information (i.e., there is no uncertainty), and a constant
marginal utility of money. Finally, and most important for policy
decision making, the whole welfare literature on price stability
assumes costless stabilization. Therefore, the relevance of this litera-
ture to the policy question of grain reserves is open to serious ques-
tions because the holding of reserves is not costless.
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QUANTITATIVE PICTURE
As may be seen in Figure 4, total grain production has fluctuated
widely from year to year in the United States and the Soviet Union.)
Further, and most importantly, these fluctuations do not fall into a;
regular pattern; i.e., they are unpredictable. We observe also some
significant variations in total grain production in Western Europe,
South Asia, and Canada. When several regions experience a poor
crop in the same year, as occurred in 1972-1973, following some
extremely poor crops in several regions in 1970-1971, the limited
stocks of grain melt away, and the interlinked world market experi-
ences a grain shortage. Given the extreme inelasticity of world demand
for the grains, such a shortage causes grain prices to shoot skyward.
Grain crops around the world were very good in 1973-1974 (see
Figure 4). But several regions of the world again experienced poor
crops in 1974-1975, and the grain crisis of 1972-1973 began to
return with rising grain prices.
The total world grain balance is summarized in Figure 4 and
Statistical Appendix Tables 21-24. Total world grain production
fell below trend in 1972-1973, 1974-1975, and 1975-1976 and
again in 1979-1980. World stocks of grain fell to pipeline levels im
1972-1973 and remained at that precarious level through 1975-19763
World stocks of grain were built up during the period 1976-1977
through 1978-1979. But in 1979-1980 world stocks of grain tookl
another tumble. Further, total stocks of wheat and coarse grains
as a percent of world utilization declined in the 1970s from what
they were in the 1960s. 1
World utilization of grain is increasing at just about the 1960-1971
production trend line (Figure 5). Thus, the fluctuations in produc-
tion around the trend line result in an accumulation or deaccumula-
tion of stocks with a consequent fluctuation in world grain prices.
But whenever grain stock levels are reduced to pipeline levels, physi-
cal grain shortages begin to appear in grain-deficit countries around
the world, and grain prices increased sharply. And this world grain
price instability will very likely be intensified in the future as grain
production is pushed onto marginal lands where yields are highly
variable.
SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 2
"
Empirical research on grain reserves and grain storage has a reason-
ably long history. Gustafson, in 1958, showed that under perfect
E
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competition private grain holders would store and release grain
optimally so that expected marginal returns from storage would
equal marginal costs. Waugh, in a pioneering study in 1967, provided
some empirical estimates of needed reserve stock levels for the
United States for the several grains.
But an avalanche of empirical studies dealing with grain reserves
occurred in the 1970s, particularly since the great price upheaval
in 1972-1973. This research has dealt with two interrelated policy
goals: grain price stability and food security. Both goals are sought
to mitigate the adverse consequences of fluctuations in grain pro-
duction, caused mainly by weather fluctuations and magnified by
barriers to trade. But this research has typically moved in different
directions. Studies that focus on market price stabilization often do
not address the impacts of instability on the poor and vulnerable
groups in the world populations, although some argue that eliminat-
ing the peaks and troughs of price fluctuations contributes indirectly
to food security. On the other hand, studies of the means to prevent
critical food shortages tend to stress only grain supply availability
for poor nations and for poor people in those nations. The impact
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of storage or reserve stocks on prices is often ignored in such studies.
Further, food aid policy often becomes related in some way to food
security studies.
In general, research sponsored by international organizations (e.g.,
World Bank, FAO) tends to focus on grain reserves as a means of
providing food security, while studies undertaken by economists
in universitites and research foundations tend to emphasize national
or international price stabilization. This dichotomy with regard to
grain reserve goals acts to confound and confuse the debate about
grain reserve policies. Researchers concerned with food security may
not pursue the implications of their proposals on grain markets.
Conversely, researchers who emphasize the price stabilization of
grain reserves may fail to examine the food security implications of
their proposals.
Much of the debate about grain reserves has centered on the size
of the reserve stock and rules governing its operation. Empirical
studies concerned with stock size have either estimated or assumed
the appropriate demand, supply, and trade relations for the grains.
The nature of these relations is, however, critical to the conclusions.
Since all grain reserve programs seek to smooth out variations in
supplies over time, the amount that the supply curve shifts from one
year to the next is fundamental. The more variation there is in pro-
duction, the larger the reserve stock must be to effectively smooth
out supplies over time.
In the absence of free trade, national production variations become
increasingly relevant. Moving from the global level to the national
level has important implications for reserve stock requirements. If,
for example, nations adopt policies to balance inter-year supplies
from internal stocks, with little or no adjustments in foreign trade,
total world stock requirements must increase. And, if trading nations
seal off their domestic markets from international supply-price
fluctuations, they force the full impact of such fluctuations and
adjustments onto those nations maintaining an open link to the
world market.
The price elasticities of supply and demand used in the calculation
of stock size also have an important effect on the conclusions reached.
Although it is generally agreed that demand and supply for grains
are price inelastic, there is no general agreement on the exact elas-
ticity values. Yet, a modest change in the price elasticity of demand
from -.1 to -.2 can result in a substantial difference in the conclusion
with regard to the required stock size to achieve some desired level
of stability. As the price elasticity of demand increases, the stock
requirement to stabilize markets decreases.
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Despite these difficulties, some firm conclusions can be drawn
from the many and diverse empirical studies of grain reserve pro-
posals over the past decade. First, food grain security against most
disasters and emergencies that occur around the world could be met
by a clearly identified emergency grain reserve of between 10 and 15
million metric tons of wheat and rice above working, or pipeline,
stocks. Second, in all but the most extreme cases, world grain price
variations could be held within a price band of plus or minus 30
percent of an agreed-upon price level with the deployment of a
reserve stock of wheat and coarse grains of some 15 million metric
tons. Moving to a price stabilization goal wherein world grain price
variations were held within a price band of plus or minus 10 percent
of an agreed-upon price level would require the deployment of a
reserve stock of perhaps 80 million tons. These are the outside inven-
tory limits of a world grain reserve program. The exact inventory
requirements of such a range of price stabilization bands would
depend upon: 1) the width of the price band, 2) the accepted risk
of being unable to operate because of inadequate stocks, 3) the price
responsiveness of demand and supply, and 4) the extent and level of
trade barriers. While the empirical results are incomplete, we do i
know something about the magnitudes of grain reserves necessary
to achieve the stated policy objectives.
There is considerably less agreement with regard to the benefits,
,
or costs, of storage or reserve stock programs for producers, con-
sumers, individual country economies, and the world economy. Wel-
fare analyses indicate that world consumers would gain by food grain
price stabilization and producers would lose. Similarly, importing
countries would gain and exporting countries would lose. But because
of the sensitivity of the welfare calculations and the dubious assump-
tions of these studies, the above conclusions cannot be considered
firm conclusions. Moreover, most welfare analyses of a grain reserve
program seek to measure the effects of such a program in isolation
from other policies and programs rather than in interaction with
other policies and programs.
Finally, the impact of storage programs of the export grain econ-
omies of the United States and Canada has been the subject of
numerous studies (Houck and Ryan, pp. 13-16). Not surprisingly,
export variability was found to be a major cause of grain price insta-
bility in the United States. Hence, this research indicates that reduced
variation in grain exports would reduce price instability in U.S. grain
markets as effectively as the operation of an adequately-sized
grain reserve program. Further, because large grain exports and high
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grain prices tend to go hand in hand, programs designed to stabilize
prices tend to reduce producer earnings in the exporting nations in
the short run. This conclusion does not, however, take into account
the longer-run effects of market stability and assured supplies on
export earnings. It may be that importing nations would be more
willing to rely on foreign trade for their grain supplies, rather than on
11 Pri« domestic production, if they were assured of those supplies.
In sum, the empirical studies are rich in ideas, approaches, and
; estimates in the broad areas of food security and market stabilization.
But the results of those studies still leave much room for debate and
controversy with respect to the magnitudes of grain reserve programs,
h their efficacy, and their desirability.
ANALYSIS OF GRAIN RESERVE ALTERNATIVES
The United States and the world have and will likely continue to
experience, wide, sharp, and unpredictable fluctuations in food
prices as well as in farm product prices. However, it does not follow
that food price stabilization should be achieved through the opera-
tion of a reserve stock program for a major food component (i.e.,
the grains). There are some (e.g., leaders of the American Agricultural
Movement) who argue that price stabilization can be achieved
through government fiat. And there are others who assert that if
all market rigidities and interferences were eliminated, market price
fluctuations would be greatly moderated. Consumption adjustments
and production adjustments along benign relationships would then
produce a desired level of price stability.
Except in certain short-run situations, product price stabilization
by command or through exhortation in atomistic markets is unlikely
to be productive and hence is not discussed here further. But the
elimination of market imperfections and restrictions could, where
the relevant relationships are benign, result in increased market
price stability. The consumer demand for food is, however, not
benign; it is severely price inelastic. Further, runs of good weather
or bad weather can lead to large market surpluses or market deficits,
respectively. Given the price inelasticity of demand, unless that
uneven flow of production is smoothed out over time, farm product
prices, hence food prices, must fluctuate in the extreme. Private
firms cannot effectuate this smoothing out of food supplies over
time because the risks are too high and the costs too great. Thus,
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government is invariably called upon to intervene to redistribute
those lumpy supplies in a more even fashion over time.
In sum, the logic of an inelastic consumer demand for food andi
the experience with crop surpluses and deficits both tell us that every
country whose food supply is dependent upon uncertain, unpre-
dictable weather should consider a reserve stock program of some
kind, somewhere, to even out the flow of staple products (e.g., the
grains) over time. And only a strong national government with
adequate resources, or a strong international agency with adequate
resources, can finance the operation of such a reserve stock program.
If the people of a national society, or an international society, wish
to achieve a reasonable degree of food price stability, they must be
prepared to accept the operation of, and to support financially, a
governmentally managed reserve stock program in the staple com-
modities such as the grains.
In the discussion that follows, three alternative grain reserve
program proposals are examined.
Existing Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve
Grain prices were declining in the United States and around the
world in 1977 as the result of two bumper crops in a row. In response
to these falling grain prices the Carter Administration announced in
August 1977 the establishment of a farmer-owned grain reserve
program for wheat and feed grains during 1978-1981. The passage
of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 by the Congress formally
authorized the grain reserve program. This program offered farmers
a long-term loan on their grains plus payments for storage. In return
farmers agreed to certain restrictions on sales. In the words of the
Administration the purpose of the reserve was to
...maintain U.S. agricultural export preeminence by assuring customers of a
dependable source of products, thereby encouraging further growth of overseas
markets for U.S. farm goods;... strengthen farm prices when supplies are exces-
sive;... dampen food price gyrations and combat inflation (USDA).
As the name of this program suggests, farmers were the owners of
the grain held in the reserve. Once the release price was reached in
an upward price movement, all marketing decisions were those of
the farmers. They might sell their grain or continue to hold it. The
government's role was to make it financially attractive to farmers
;tributi
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|p store grain when market prices were low and to sell when market
prices were high and thus induce farmers to make marketing deci-
sions that would even out supplies coming onto the market and to
moderate market price fluctuations. 3
How successful has this governmentally-sponsored, farmer-owned
grain reserve program been in its operations? Between late 1977 and
March 1979 farmers placed in reserve some 412 million bushels of
wheat, 736 million bushels of corn, and lesser amounts of oats,
f barley, and sorghum, or about 20 percent of one year's production
of wheat and about 10 percent of one year's production of corn.
'^ (The operation of the grain reserve program may be viewed graphi-
cally in Figure 6.) And this occurred during a three-year period of
good to excellent world grain crops. In this context prices received
by farmers for wheat in the United States rose steadily throughout
1977-1978, increased moderately in 1978-1979, and rose sharply
in 1979, reaching the release price of $3.29 per bushel in May 1979.
Prices received by farmers for corn rose significantly in the first
half of the marketing year 1977-1978, declined in the second half
of that year, and then turned up again in 1978-1979, reaching the
release price of $2.50 per bushel in June 1979. Rising exports of
wheat and corn, in volume terms, contributed to the upward trend
in grain prices during the period 1977-1979, as did the removal
of significant amounts of wheat and corn from the commercial
market through the operations of the farmer-owned grain reserve.
On this point all the experts are in agreement.
How much the limited release of wheat and corn stocks from the
reserve program in the second half of 1979 contributed to the leveling
off of grain prices in that period is subject to debate. Probably the
record-breaking grain crop harvested in the 1979-1980 crop year
had a greater effect on grain prices in the second half of 1979 than
any other single factor. But the release of stocks from the grain
reserve likely had some modest influence in the leveling off of grain
price increases in the second half of 1979.
In summary, then, one must conclude that the farmer-owned
grain reserve program operated in the direction of evening out sup-
plies over time and moderating grain price fluctuations. But it is
questionable whether the program has the size, the capacity, and the
design to deal with major grain gluts or shortages. The program, as
designed, most properly should be viewed as an adjunct to the price
support program; it did help support producer grain prices in 1977-
1978. But it involves no commitment to stabilize grain prices in
accordance with a defined stabilization goal, and it lacks the capacity
98 Cochrane, Martin, and Spitze
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and the programmatic features to control large upward thrusts inJ
ir
grain prices.
International System of Coordinated National Grain Reserves
The United States pressed hard for an international agreement oni
grain reserves in 1978-1979 in which individual nations, both im-
porters and exporters, would hold and operate their own individual
grain reserve programs in accordance with internationally agreed-
upon rules and objectives. If such an international system of coordin-
ated grain reserves could be brought into operation with a total
average reserve capacity of some 80 million tons of grain, there is
no reason why such an international program could not stabilize
world grain prices with a range of plus or minus 10 percent of the
agreed-upon stabilization target price in every year except the mostt
extreme shortage or glut situation. The problem with this alterna-
tive is obtaining the international agreement.
The United States and 66 other trading nations deliberated from
February 1978 to March 1979 under the auspices of the International
Wheat Council on the formation of an international system off
coordinated wheat reserve stocks. But they could not reach an agree-
ment. They could not agree on a definition of reserve stocks, the
target level of. stabilization, the rules for the accumulation and
the release of stocks, or the procedure for assisting the developing
nations to finance the holding of reserve stocks. Thus, the 67 grain
trading nations gave up and went home in March 1979.
Since it can be assumed that most, if not all, of the nations involved
had a genuine interest in achieving greater price and supply stability
on the international grain market, why could they not reach agree-
ment? There are doubtless many specific reasons. But two basic
reasons should be recognized. First, many of the nations involved
had already developed some specific market arrangements designed
to provide them with internal grain price and supply stability that
were well suited to other institutional arrangements of their coun-
tries, e.g., the variable levy system of the EC, the grain monopoly
marketing boards of Canada and Australia, and the National Food
Agency of Japan with exclusive monopolistic power to import
foodstuffs. Thus, these countries were in no hurry to create new
institutional arrangements that they were not sure they needed or
that might jeopardize their existing marketing arrangements.
Second, all the nations at the negotiating conference recognized
full well that the United States had the strongest interest in achieving
jyi
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an international system of coordinated grain reserves with the capac-
ity to effectively stabilize world grain prices and supplies. This strong
(interest on the part of the United States grows out of five related
causative elements. The United States wants to be a reliable supplier
of grains to the world market at all times. The United States wants
a stable domestic level of grain prices that contributes to stable
international grain markets. It wants to maintain as free an inter-
national trade system as possible. It wants to help feed the poor
nations. And the United States wants all grain-trading nations to
share in the cost of operating a grain reserve program. This being
the case, the other 66 grain-trading nations were inclined to let
the United States take the lead in the establishment of and in provid-
ing the financial support for a grain reserve program with the capacity
to stabilize world grain prices and supplies. But, as of the spring of
1979, the United States was not yet ready to underwrite the princi-
pal cost of a world wheat reserve program with the capacity to
stabilize world grain prices. So the negotiating conference broke
down.
Since the principal provisions were never agreed upon, it is diffi-
cult to discuss the economic consequences of an international
system of national wheat reserve programs. However, two general
conclusions can be reached. First, the country composition of such
a system, involving the less developed countries as well as the devel-
oped, would have almost certainly insured the establishment of a
food security wheat reserve with the capacity to protect the very
poor countries against production shortfalls and physical catastrophes.
Second, the establishment of an international wheat reserve would
have made some contribution to moderating world market price
fluctuations in the grains as wheat substituted for coarse grains and
rice. But a reserve program in wheat alone would not have been an
effective program instrument for stabilizing world grain prices.
U.S. Reserves and Bilateral Agreements—An Innovative Alternative
Is there a way for the United States to be a reliable supplier to its
regular foreign customers and maintain a stable domestic grain price
level without its operating unilaterally a grain reserve program ade-
quate to stabilize world grain prices? In a technical sense there is a
way. That way may be described as follows.
The United States would operate unilaterally a grain reserve pro-
gram with, say, half the capacity to stabilize world grain prices, that
is, a grain reserve that averaged 40 million tons in size. This grain
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reserve program could be the present farmer-owned reserve program
with certain modifications. Reserve stocks would be accumulated
at the loan rate for each category of grain. Grain would be released
on the market when the market price reached the now defined re-
lease and call prices. But in this proposed program farmers would be>
required to sell their grain onto the commercial market at a manda-
tory call price. They would not be permitted to hold their grain
and speculate. The ultimate total size of this grain reserve stock
program would depend upon the number of, and specific provisions
of, various bilateral agreements reached through negotiations as
discussed below.
To the proposed reserve program would be attached a network
of long-term bilateral agreements. The United States would seek,
through negotiations, a bilateral grain agreement with each of itss
important customer nations. Under the provisions of such an agree-
ment the United States would guarantee to supply the customer
nation at all times its historic import quantity of grain, plus some
agreed-upon growth factor, at a price no higher than the upper limit
of the price stabilization band in effect in the domestic U.S. economy.
In turn, the customer nation would agree to build a grain reserve
consistent in size with the grain utilization in its economy and oper-
ate that reserve program in accordance with the rules of the U.S.
reserve program. Countries that did not enter into long-term grain
agreements with the United States would not be permitted to pur-
chase grain when the market price reached the upper limit of the
price stabilization band. As long as market prices in the United
States fluctuated within the defined price stabilization band, all
countries would be free to purchase grain from the United States.
The advantages of the proposed program are several in number.
First, the United States could launch this worldwide program uni-
laterally. It need not wait for approval in an international negotiating
conference in which the chances of gaining approval are, indeed,
slim. Second, as the number of this particular kind of bilateral
grains agreement increased, so would the probability of achieving
increased stability in the world grain market. Third, the important
importing nations would share in the cost of building and operating
a grain reserve program with the capacity to stabilize the world
grain market. Fourth, such a development would regularize U.S. grain
exports and contribute to a rational planning of annual grain pro-
duction.
There are disadvantages to consider too. First, the development
of a network of bilateral grains agreements would further increase
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the amount and degree of governmental intervention in the domestic
and international economies, considered by many as undesirable.
Second, the purpose of the agreement procedure is to discriminate
^ouldJamong foreign buyers. Those who had signed agreements would
be assured of supplies in periods of grain shortages; those who had
not signed would be excluded from the U.S. market during periods
of shortages.
The development of a system of bilateral agreements runs counter
to the long-standing policy of the United States to seek free trade.
The question might be asked: Why would any importing nation wish
to enter into a long-term grains agreement with the United States?
The answer is that in a period of prospective short supplies in the
world those countries would be assured of their historic quantities
of grain imports from the United States at a stabilized price. And
that could be a strong inducement in the 1980s.
NOTES
These and other important trends in the supply and utilization of wheat,
coarse grains, and rice may be found in Statistical Appendix Tables.
This section draws heavily on the report by Houck and Ryan.
For additional detail on the release and call price procedure of the grain
reserve program and on the actual prices for the period 1977-1980, see
the section titled "Grain Reserves" (page 13) and Table 1 (page 17) in
Chapter 1.
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7 THE FOODSTAMP PROGRAM
Sylvia Lane
THE CURRENT PROBLEM
The food stamp program, the nation's primary policy tool for the
provision of domestic food assistance, has been under continual
legislative review since its inception in 1964. Major revisions that will
entail its curtailment or even its termination will, in all likelihood, be
made in the next few years.
In 1977 and 1978 Congress considered legislation to replace
existing federal welfare programs, including the food stamp program,
with a single coordinated program to assure employment, training,
and income supplementation for low-income citizens able to work.
Income support would have been provided for citizens who had
incomes below the level considered necessary for a minimally satis-
factory level of living and who were not available for work by
reason of disability, age, or family circumstance (U.S. Senate, 95th
Congress, 2nd Session). In 1979 Congress considered another "wel-
fare reform" package that would have provided cash assistance instead
of food stamps for at least some recipients (Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report). More recently, the Food and Nutrition Service of
the United States Department of Agriculture authorized demonstra-
tion projects to test whether providing cash assistance instead of
food stamps would affect participation rates among the eligible
elderly and their food expenditures and nutritional status.
Although the phasing-out of the food stamp program is under
consideration, it is still one of the most important components of
Sylvia Lane is professor of agricultural economics, University of California, Davis
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our public assistance system. Therefore, the policy issue being con-
sidered by Congress and addressed in this chapter is whether public
assistance should be given in cash or in kind in the form of food
stamps (U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, p. 267).
Tullock has clearly argued that from the standpoint of the poor
person the receipt of a direct cash payment as a subsidy is superior
(in terms of consumer welfare resulting from greater freedom of
choice) to a subsidy in kind, and his position is now widely accepted
(Clarkson 1975, 1976). The direct consumer benefits of the food
stamp program as opposed to a cash assistance program are an in-
crease in the consumption of food (for which benefits vary by
individuals) and, for some, an improvement in nutrition. Benefits
to food producers are increases in net revenue because of the program-
induced increase in the demand for food.
To justify the food stamp program joint benefits to taxpayers,
producers, and food stamp program participants must be high enough
to offset: 1) program costs, not only in fiscal terms, but in regard
to the opportunity cost of participants' time necessary for applying
for and obtaining food stamps, and the program-induced distortions
in the allocation of resources in the overall economy, 2) participants'
loss of utility since they legally can only buy food with the added
income, and 3) participants' and nonparticipants' welfare losses
resulting from higher food prices and the distortion in the quantities
of food and nonfood in consumption packages relative to consump-
tion preferences. 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The current food stamp program evolved from earlier attempts
in the United States to dispose of agricultural surpluses by providing
food to the needy. The first of these was the Federal Surplus Relief
Corporation's purchase of surplus farm commodities for distribution
to the unemployed and their families in the depression years between
1933 and 1938. It was followed by a food stamp program that was
in effect briefly between 1939 and 1942 and was terminated when
agricultural surpluses and unemployment vanished because of World
War II. Surpluses reappeared after the war. Consequently, the Agri-
cultural Act of 1949 authorized a food distribution program that
made surplus food available to local governments for distribution to
those in need. When, in conjunction with the war on poverty, em-
phasis shifted to eliminating hunger, a second food stamp program
was e
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was enacted in 1964. It followed pilot studies authorized by Execu-
tive order in 1961, which indicated that the nutritional status of
low-income households improved if they received food stamps.
The 1964 Act declared it to be a policy of Congress "to raise the
levels of nutrition among low income households" (U.S. Congress).
Amendments, in 1971, to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, provided
for increased benefits and national eligibility standards. Food coupon
allotments changed from levels that provided recipients an "opportu-
nity more nearly to obtain a low-cost nutritionally adequate diet" to
the "opportunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet" (U.S. Con-
gress). National eligibility standards were based on need and not on
characteristics of participating household. 2 Implementation of a
nationwide food stamp program by July 1974 was mandated in the
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (U.S. Congress).
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 tightened eligibility standards
to reduce program costs, eliminated the purchase requirement (by
1979) to encourage participation, and extended the program's author-
ization until 1981 (Public Law 95-113). 3 The three major reasons why
program participation and consequent program costs have increased
over the years have been increases in program benefits, increases in
unemployment, and the extension of program availability to new
project areas (Hines, MacDonald).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The food stamp program expands the demand for food by pro-
viding eligible households with additional purchasing power, which
can only be used to buy food. The value of the food stamp allotment
i.e., the "bonus stamps," which households currently participating
in the program receive, equals the cost to such households of the
"thrifty food plan" less an amount equal to 30 percent of the house-
holds' income as computed for food stamp program eligibility. The
minimum allotment for one or two person households is $10 a
month. Of course, bonus stamps may "free up" income that would
have been spent for food, and that income may be spent on other
commodities. Some of this "freed up" income may be spent on
additional food. Bonus stamps do not all have to be used, but this
loss of potential food consumption is probably small. Food stamp
program recipients, who, in view of prices, prefer to spend a smaller
proportion of their real income (money income plus bonus stamps)
on food and a larger proportion than estimated by policy makers on
other commodities may do so.
108 Lane
In Figure 7 there is depicted food consumption ofOX and nonfood
consumption of OY at a utility level of Si, under conditions of no
food stamp assistance. With a food stamp program and a purchase
requirement, food consumption increases to OB and nonfood remains
unchanged, producing a higher utility level S2. However, with bonus
stamps and no purchase requirement, consumers may choose to
substitute some food purchases, QB, for nonfood, thereby reaching
a higher level of utility S3. 4 Theoretically, increases in households'
disposable income (food stamps serve as an increase in households' dis-
posable real income), if spent on nutritious foods, should increase
nutritional intake. 5
Food stamp program participants theoretically will buy more
food not only because food stamps can only be used to buy food,
and bonus stamps give them additional purchasing power, but
because both the income effect and the substitution effect will be
C
Nonfood
X Q
Source: Adapted from Sullivan.
B E" Food
Figure 7. Comparison of the Consumption Effects Between a
Food Stamp Program With and Without a Purchase
Requirement and the "Cash Out" Alternative.
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operative. The income effect, i.e., the observed tendency for people
if to buy more when they have higher incomes (income elasticity of
demand greater than zero), is relevant since program participants'
incomes are increased. This effect is small for the average consumer
because food has an income elasticity of demand of less than one.
However, this varies greatly by income levels; i.e., a lower proportion
is purchased out of higher incomes and a higher proportion out of
lower incomes. Engel's Law states that as income increases, the pro-
portion spent on food decreases. Stated differently, the marginal
propensity to buy food or the proportion of additional income that
will be spent on food is lower the higher the income level. Thus,
there are proportionately higher food purchases by low income
consumers when their incomes are increased, e.g., by food stamps.
The substitution effect will also act to increase the food purchases
of food stamp program participants because, since they are using
food stamps, food becomes relatively cheaper than other commodi-
ties they purchase. They will, therefore, substitute food for other
purchases in order to increase utility derived from their total expen-
diture for a particular period (budget). Thus, a food stamp program
should increase the quantity of food demanded and the price of
food (see Figure 8). 6
An increase in the price of food not only impacts on farm produc-
ers but also impacts on producers of production inputs, e.g., energy.
This could cause slight increases in input quantities demanded.
However, since price elasticities of both the supply and demand for
food at retail (as they are for farm inputs) are relatively low (Figure
8), the effects of additional demand occasioned by the program on
the retail price of food and on farm inputs are probably amplified. 7
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Food Stamp Effects on the Retail Sector and Farm Income
The food stamp program in the United States emerged as a response
to concerns about the level of farm income, which was thought to
be relatively low, and about hunger and malnutrition among the
poor. Thus the program may be evaluated in the light of its effects
in these areas of concern.
In the period 1960-1976 per capita disposable income of the farm
population rose from 54 percent to about 78 percent of nonfarm
Demand without
food stamp program
Demand with
a food stamp program
Di D 2
QlQ2 Quantity
Figure 8. Effect of Food Stamp Program on the Quantity
Demanded and Price of Food at Retail.
disposable income per capita (U.S. Department of Commerce). How
much did the food stamp program contribute to this improvement?
In 1975, the peak year for food stamp program participation, the
total value of food stamps in circulation represented about 4.4 per-
cent of $185 billion, the total expenditure on food, or approximately
$8.1 billion. Approximately $4.9 billion of that was in bonus food
stamps issued in that year, representing an implicit increase in
food expenditure not available before implementation of the food
stamp program. But since the best available estimates are that only
between 30 to 57 percent of the income received as bonus stamps
is used to purchase additional food (Nelson and Perrin 1976;Stucker;
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Schrimper), the increased demand for food generated by the food
stamp program for that year may be estimated as approximately
$1.5 to $2.8 billion. The current food stamp program's $5.8 billion
in bonus stamps adds about $2.3 billion (based on the approximate
average of 40 percent of bonus stamps being spent on additional
food) to retail food purchases of low income households. This means
an increase in food expenditures by these households of less than 8
percent. To calculate the net increase in retail food expenditures,
one has to subtract about $500 million (Nelson and Perrin 1976,
1978) of reduced food expenditures by higher income households,
who are taxed to pay for the program.
The farmer's share of retail food expenditures, in 1975, was liber-
ally estimated at 42 percent. 8 Therefore, the addition to farm income
in 1975, as a result of the food stamp program, was approximately
$.6 to $1.2 billion, representing approximately 1 percent of the gross
farm income in that year (U.S. Congress; Stuck er).
In 1978 total food expenditures were estimated to be $220 billion.
Stamps distributed under the food stamp program were valued at
$7.5 billion, i.e., 3.4 percent of the total 1978 food expenditures
(Stucker). This included the stamps issued that had to be purchased
by food stamp program participants and the additional expenditure
on food from additional real income generated by bonus stamps.
With reference to the effects of increased food sales on food prices,
by food groups, a recent study shows "that the food stamp program
has likely had a statistically significant but rather small positive in-
fluence on the prices for most food groups, other things remaining
constant" (Boehm and Belongia, p. 7). Meats, cereals, and bakery
products prices were especially influenced. Schrimper found that
each 10 percent increase in participants' demand for food might
result in an 0.08 to 4.0 percent increase in food prices, depending on
the price elasticity of the retail supply for food and the share of the
total food market accounted for by program participants.
Additional Effects on the Economy
To assess the food stamp program's effects on the United States
economy, Nelson and Perrin made a study, assuming a closed econ-
omy, utilizing an input-output model to estimate impacts of transfers
of stipulated amounts of income from taxpayers to food stamp pro-
gram participants. The assumption was made that federal taxes of
the nonparticipant household sector were increased, and the sector's
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disposable income similarly decreased, by an amount equal to the
value of the bonus stamps issued in fiscal years 1974 and 1976
(Nelson and Perrin, 1978).
Table 6 presents the estimated increased business receipts (output)
and gross national product generated during fiscal year 1976 by the
injection of $5,313 million of bonus stamps. On the basis of previous
studies, Nelson and Perrin assumed 55 percent was spent for food
and 45 percent for nonfood items. Under these assumptions, business
receipts rose about $2.3 billion more than if there had been no pro-
gram, and gross national product grew by $838 million. Increased
output was associated with an increase in the number of jobs needed
to meet the increase in final demand. In 1974 there were an esti-
mated 76,561 more jobs with the program than there would have
been without it. Table 6 also contains data pertaining to the 1976
program, assuming elimination of a purchase requirement. Business
receipts would have increased by $544.4 million and the GNP by
$306.5 million under these assumptions. However, price effects
were not considered in this study. Higher retail food prices may have,
through their effect on wages, served to reduce aggregate output
and through their effect on factor supply prices, reduced exports.
There is also a structural impact of the program on the food retail-
ing sector. The smaller stores benefit proportionately more from the
food stamp program in terms of absolute dollars (Nelson). A study
by Nelson and Perrin (1976b, p. 1005) of the food stamp program's
effects throughout the economy (Table 6) leads to the conclusion
that "the program's impact upon patterns of resource allocation is of
sufficient magnitude to merit particular consideration in policy
deliberations ... ," especially those concerned with the price of food.
Effects on Nutrition
The question of whether the food stamp program has improved
the nutritional quality of diets of low income households does not
have a simple answer because the expansion of food consumption
does not necessarily imply an improved level of nutrition. Several
studies have been addressed to this subject. West and Price found
"bonus food stamps significantly increase the [dollar] value of food
consumed" (p. 728). Lane stated that "the programs (the food stamp
program and the food distribution program) apparently affect nutri-
tion through increasing the amount of food available to participants
and through increasing real income, part of which was spent on
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Table 7. Distribution of Food Expenditures for Sample of Food Stamp
Program Participant and Nonparticipant Households, 1974
Food Stamp All Other
Food Item Households Households
. . . percent
All Meat Products 36.5 36.3
Beef and veal 12.2 15.4
Pork 10.8 8.7
Poultry 6.4 4.7
Other 7.1 7.5
Dairy Products 13.8 13.7
Milk and cream 10.5 8.8
Other 3.3 4.9
Eggs 3.5 2.6
Fruits and Vegetables 13.7 14.2
Flour and Cereal Products 5.2 3.2
Bakery Products 7.7 8.7
Fats and Oils 3.3 3.0
Sugars and Sweets 2.7 3.0
Snacks 0.6 1.5
Nonalcoholic Beverages 7.1 7.2
All Other 5.9
100.0
6.6
100.0
Source: Boehm and Nelson, 1978a.
additional food" (p. 114). O'Connor, Madden, and Prindle in apprais-
ing the effect of the negative income tax experiment on the North
Carolina sample found strong evidence that receiving additional
income had beneficial effects on the overall quality of low-income
recipients' diets. Recipients used the additional income to acquire
foods containing nutrients in which their diets were deficient.
However, receiving additional income had no effects on the quality
of recipients' diets in the Iowa sample. It was found that these recipi-
ents represented a higher income group.
When food stamp users' shopping habits were compared with
those of nonstamp users, it was found that apparent differences
in food purchasing patterns were primarily a result of previously-
established shopping habits rather than a result of the increase in
purchasing power afforded by the bonus coupons (Logan and De-
I
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oach). Food purchasing patterns are influenced more by age and
ducation levels than by income, according to this study. A final
udgment about program effectiveness in improving diets is not
ossible but "evidence on the dietary consequences of the food
tamp program supports the conclusion that the nutritional objec-
ives of the program are generally not being satisfied and that the
program in fact makes little positive contribution to diet improve-
ment" (Clarkson 1975, 1976). Apparently food stamps only result
n nutritional improvement when there is not enough money to buy
'ood, but this only applies to the lowest income groups (Lane;
Madden and Yoder). Madden found no significant difference in the
nutritional adequacy of diets between participants and nonpartici-
pants until two weeks after payday when they no longer had enough
money to buy food; then, food stamps made a difference.
The program does virtually nothing to change dietary habits. On
;he other hand, allegations that the stamps are being used to purchase
non-nutritious foods or more expensive convenience products do
not seem to be justified. "Available evidence now indicates that
food stamp households allocate their food budgets in about the same
way as do other households" (Boehm and Nelson, 1978a, p. 10).
(See Table 7.) Food stamp households, according to this study, spent
a higher percentage for fresh milk, cream, pork, poultry products,
flour, and cereals and a lower percentage for snacks. Thus, Mac-
Donald's conclusion that "more direct intervention to change the
nutritional efficiency of low-income households is needed" has to
be regarded with caution. A study by Bivens and Abdel-Ghany
suggests nutritional efficiency decreases as income rises. Low-income
households were found to be more nutritionally efficient, i.e., ac-
quired more nutrients for every dollar spent.
POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The two policy alternatives currently before Congress are the
continuance of the current program and the cashing out of food
stamps in conjunction with the passage and implementation of a
welfare reform program providing public service employment and
income supplements.
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Continuation of the 1977 Act
The net effect of continuing the present program as compared to
having no food stamp program would be: 1) a slight increase in farm
(approximately 1 percent) and food industry income, especially as
program participation increases due to an increase in unemployment,
2) a slight increase in food consumption, and 3) the alleviation of
hunger among some low income consumers. Effects on nutrition are
likely to be positive for the lowest income groups.
The program serves well as an income supplement program, and is
available to low-income families not eligible for other forms of
categorical welfare. It also supplements AFDC payments in low aid-
for-dependent-children-payment-level states (U.S. Congress).
Because it increases food consumption the program does increase
the demand for food. Food prices are increased slightly for all con-
sumers, and consequently wage demands are increased. The export
market may also be marginally affected in an adverse way by the
higher prices. The Treasury burden has been fairly constant, with
the food stamp program operating in 1975-1979 at a public outlay
of $5 to $6 billion annually, or 1 percent of the federal budget
(Statistical Appendix Table 16).
"Cashing Out" of Food Stamps in Conjunction with Welfare Reform
The net effect of phasing out the food stamp program and adopt-
ing a welfare reform package that includes a jobs and cash assistance
program would depend on the eligibility and benefit provisions of
the new legislation. If the "Better Jobs and Income Program" pro-
posed in 1977 by the Administration had passed, families of four
with over $4,200 in annual income (and other households with
corresponding income characteristics) and eligible for food stamps
would have lost their bonus stamps benefits. This would have applied
to about 20 percent of those eligible at that time for food stamps,
generally those with higher levels of income.
Some 49 percent of households receiving only food stamps as a
welfare benefit in 1977 and 50 percent of those receiving both food
stamps and cash assistance would have had their public assistance
benefits increased, according to Congressional Budget Office estimates.
Some 36 percent (28 percent receiving only food stamps and 8
percent receiving food stamps plus cash assistance) would have had
public assistance benefits reduced. The gainers would have outnum-
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bered the losers. In addition, the tax burden associated with this
specific public objective would have been lessened, and the added
food demand and farm income marginally reduced. Concomitantly,
those still eligible for continued welfare benefits would have experi-
enced complete choice in income use, allowing for the optimization
of utility.
The impact on food expenditures of passage of a program like
that proposed, with elimination of the food stamp program, has been
estimated by Boehm and Nelson. They found aggregate food expen-
ditures and the farm value of domestically produced foods largely
unaffected. Aggregate farm income would have been reduced by
about $100 million as a result of the estimated three-tenths of a
billion dollar reduction in aggregate retail expenditures on food.
The increased level of funding under the proposal explains this
finding.
No Stamps but Targeted Assistance—An Innovative Alternative
The third alternative would include: 1) elimination of the food
stamp program, 2) minimal income supplementation through either a
negative income tax or the supplemental security income program
for those who cannot afford a nutritionally adequate diet, and
3) efforts to improve nutrition through nutrition education programs
and targeted food assistance programs, such as the Special Supple-
mental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children or the
School Lunch Program. This is the most cost-effective approach to
improving the nutritional status of those whose health and produc-
tivity are likely to be affected by poor nutrition. Lower income
recipients' diets would probably tend to improve only slightly with
either of the income supplement approaches unless the funds were
budgeted throughout the year, since evidence suggests those families
seldom budget food expenditures (Madden and Yoder). Targeted
food assistance programs would tend to have positive effects on
nutrition (Sexauer).
The net effect on food consumption and farm income of such a
policy would depend on its eligibility and benefit provisions and the
extent of nutrition education. However, it is likely that a carefully
designed and targeted food policy would provide as much or more
improvement in average nutrition, as great an increase in food expen-
ditures, and as much protection to farm income as either of the other
two alternatives. Due to the income supplementation involved, the
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Treasury cost should be no greater than that of the second alterna-
tive, but more than that entailed by continuation of the presentt
policy.
NOTES
Joint benefits to taxpayers, producers, and program participants from any
cash assistance program enacted would also have to be high enough to off-
set fiscal and other program costs in order to justify the program.
Currently, participation in the food stamp program is limited to those
households whose: 1) net incomes (after a set standard deduction, a 20
percent earned income deduction, and a deduction for dependent care and
shelter costs limited to about 50 percent of income) are below nonfarm
income poverty guidelines of the federal government, and 2) financial
assets do not exceed $1,750, or, in the case of a household consisting oft
two or more persons, one of whom is 60 and over, $3,000 (Public Law
95-113, pp. 692-694). Physically and mentally fit members of households
receiving food stamps must register and accept suitable employment, iff
it is offered, unless responsible for the care of dependent(s) or unless they
are students attending school more than half time (Public Law 95-113,
pp. 965-966).
The increase in participation and the cost of the program are depicted in
Statistical Appendix Table 17.
AB is the budget constraint before the allotment of "bonus stamps" is
received or in the absence of a program (Figure 7). The optimizing house-
hold will choose the quantity of food and nonfood, for example, OX and
OY, where the marginal rate of substitution of food and nonfood (the slope
of indifference curve Si) equals the price ratio for food and nonfood, i.e.,
the slope of AB.
CE would be the budget constraint if bonus food stamps were conceived
of simply as additional income. However, since the bonus stamps valued at
XB constrain that amount of income to food purchases, the feasible con-
sumption set, under the present program, is bounded by ANE. If there was
no substitution of nonfood for food commodities, the household would
continue to consume OY of nonfood but would consume OB of food, or be
at point Z. The household is then on a lower indifference curve (S2) than if
it were optimizing at R. S3 is the highest indifference curve it can reach.
If the marginal rate of substitution of food for nonfood is not equal to the
price ratio at Z (MRSp/NF ^ pF/pNF) ( s3 > s2h the recipient becomes
better off, i.e., derives more utility, by reducing food consumption from Z
to R (Sullivan). From the recipient's viewpoint there is no "waste" at R
since he or she may allocate income, including bonus stamps, in accordance
with his or her preferences.
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The cash-out alternative places the recipient along CE and he or she will,
in every case, optimize at R where the slope of S3 equals the slope of CE,
or the same point as with the current bonus stamp program. They would
have differed under any bonus program that issued a stamp value in food
greater than OQ.
MacDonald explains the theoretical effect of the program on nutrition using
the formula:
N = (|)(|)Y
where N measures the nutritional intake of the household, E is total expen-
diture on food, and Y is disposable income, p is a measure of household
nutritional efficiency (units of nutrition per dollar of food expenditure),
and y is the household's average propensity to consume food.
In Figure 8 the equilibrium quantity consumed is Qi at price Pi, with
demand Dj. Because of the food stamp program, demand increases to D2,
and then the equilibrium quantity increases to Q2 at price P2. To estimate
the effects of a food stamp program on quantity demanded and the price
of food to the consumer it is necessary to estimate the price elasticity of
supply and demand at the retail level. With knowledge concerning the
elasticities, the following equation, assuming market-clearing prices, may be
used to estimate the percentage change in the retail price of food occasioned
by the program (Schrimper).
(l)EPR = (T? -e)- 1 EQR
where
EPr = percentage change in retail price of food
EQr = percentage change in retail demand for food induced by the food
stamp program
77 = price elasticity of retail supply of food, and
e = price elasticity of retail demand for food.
The change in retail demand occasioned by the food stamp program is
estimated from the equation:
(2) EQR = X EB
where
X = share of total retail food market accounted for the food stamp pro-
gram participants, and
EB = percentage increase in retail food demand for program participants.
The price elasticity of the demand for food consumed in the United States
has been estimated as -.25 (Mann and St. George). No estimate has been
found of the price elasticity of the supply of food at retail, but it is as-
sumed to be relatively inelastic (Heimstra).
Identifying and estimating the farmer's share of the food dollar is a rela-
tively difficult task (Boehm and Belongia, 1978a, pp. 13-14). Depending on
the definition of "food" and related expenditures, the farmer's share ranged
from 26 percent to 39 percent in 1978. It was estimated to be 42 percent
in 1975 (U.S. Congress).
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SUMMARY
U.S. price and income policy has been evolving for over half a cen-
tury for the food and agricultural sector. That policy has gradually
expanded to encompass a wider array of problems and to attract a
broader participation of interest groups. Agricultural and food policy
is not only of interest to farmer organizations but also of concern to
consumer groups, exporters, taxpayers, agribusinesses, and rural com-
munities. This stream of public policy has been in response to a variety
of problems, including the economic welfare of farmers, the food
supply for consumers, agricultural trade, and food assistance—both
domestically and abroad. The current policy is embodied in the Food
and Agriculture Act of 1977 , which is set to expire December 31 , 1981
.
This publication provides analyses to be used by policy makers
and other citizens alike as they deliberate and decide what kind of
public policy is desired to meet the food and agricultural problems
of the 1980s. Research reported herein was designed to provide ob-
jective, reliable information and does not propose or advocate any
particular policy. It is a synthesis and interpretation of the existing
body of knowledge germane to this policy area.
The analyses include several integrated sections. Trends in the
relevant background data for the past two decades critical to policy
analysis appear in the Statistical Appendix and are presented in
terms of both yearly times-series (current and constant 1972 dol-
lars) and compound rates of change. Aggregate farm output has
risen rather consistently. Farm productivity per worker hour in the
farm sector has outpaced that of the nonfarm. Farm product prices
have not kept pace with prices paid by farmers, nor by consumers,
except during the early 1970s. Although gross income to farm fami-
lies has risen rapidly, particularly during the early 1970s, the growth
in net farm income in constant dollars has been much slower, with
income from nonfarm sources becoming more prominent. The value
of farm physical assests has grown rather dramatically, both in cur-
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rent and constant dollar terms. However, the growth was much
higher in the 1960s than in the 1970s. The growth, in both assets and
size, is most pronounced for the larger farms. Agricultural exports
and the net trade balance have risen substantially, even in constant
dollar terms, and particularly in the 1970s. Federal domestic food
assistance outlays have also risen substantially in current dollars,
particularly during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but they have
slowed considerably in constant dollars in the late 1970s.
The first chapter analyzes the economic and political environment
underlying the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, its provisions,
and its implementation. Influential factors affecting the development
of the 1977 Act were the unique national and foreign food shortages,
oil crises, and changes in international currency exchange rates, all of
which pushed prices of most commodities, particularly agricultural
and mineral, to record levels during a short, temporary period of
1972-1974. The 1977 Act represented yet another installment in the
evolution of several policy thrusts. It combined previously separate
programs concerned with farm commodities, foreign food aid, do-
mestic food stamps, and agricultural research and education, to which
was added a domestic farmer-owned grain reserve.
Analyses in the remaining chapters focus on six continuing problem
areas: farm prices and income, agriculture and food prices, agricul-
tural trade, structural changes in farming, grain reserves, and food
stamps. For each of these policy problems, an analysis is made of
the characteristics of the problem, the relevant theoretical and em-
pirical knowledge, pertinent recent trend data, and several policy
alternatives.
Each of the policy alternatives could be a logical public response
to the problem and was selected to provide a useful sample of a
wide range of possible courses of action. For each problem, one
innovative—usually untried—alternative is presented. For most of
the problems, three additional policy alternatives are presented,
namely: continuation of the 1977 Act, compensatory payments,
and effective production control options. Following a characteriza-
tion of these alternatives by the policy instruments appropriate for
their implementation, the expected economic consequences for pro-
ducers, consumers, international traders, and taxpayers are analyzed
and compared.
The analysis of each of the various problems produced findings
which should be important to future policy decisions. They can be
briefly summarized as follows. Increased farm and food price varia-
bility during the past decade, while moderated somewhat by the
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1977 Act, will attract continued public policy attention if farm in-
come and consumer food supplies are to be protected in the presence
of further technological change, highly inelastic product demand,
and growing dependence on foreign markets. Future farmer and con-
sumer welfare is also increasingly affected by those policy decisions
which impact on the livestock sector. Livestock products now re-
present a larger share of the family budget. Also the changing struc-
ture of the livestock industry makes it increasingly susceptible to a
volatile world grain market. Although the type of policies represented
by the 1977 Act have probably had minimal effect upon the persist-
ent structural change in agriculture toward greater concentration,
future policy decisions could be designed to alter the organization of
the agricultural and food system.
With the dramatic rise in this nation's dependence upon world
agricultural trade and that in turn often being largely managed by the
government of each country, future policy makers face major deci-
sions that could substantially alter the structure and management of
our foreign trade. This nation's first government subsidized farmer-
i owned grain reserve, launched by the 1977 Act, is yielding useful
data for research and future policy. While the body of knowledge
about national and international food reserves is expanding, the form,
size, and management of a future grain reserve policy will likely be a
dominant policy issue in the 1980s. Finally, the food stamp program
has undergone rapid expansion in the past decade, as well as intensive
policy review, which culminated in the removal of the purchase re-
quirement in the 1977 Act. Public decisions in the near future may
result in a substantial alteration, curtailment, or even termination of
the current food stamp program.
This systematic analysis of the current problems, discussion of
possible policies—some tried and some new—and their likely results
to various interest groups in the economy provide researchers and
|
policy makers with additional knowledge to help choose food and
, agricultural policy for the 1980s.
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GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS
Acquisition cost The price for any resource paid by an owner at
the time of purchase, usually referring to relatively fixed resources
which are used over an extended or indefinite time period.
Buffer stocks Supplies of a product which are stored in order to
moderate extreme price fluctuations by assuring a more stable
supply.
Call price The price level at which farmers with grain in the re-
serve must repay the nonrecourse loan plus any accumulated inter-
est. The call price is above the release price and is established by
the Secretary of Agriculture within the guidelines of the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1977.
Capital gains The difference between the acquisition price and a
higher current market value of a capital item such as real estate
and equipment. Capital gains may be realized by actual sale or be
an unrealized computation by assuming the capital items were sold
at current market value.
Cash flow The total funds generated internally by a firm for cov-
ering costs and investment. Farming presents unique cash flow
problems when income is generated only at the end of a production
cycle, e.g., with annual crops and with livestock, or where crop
failures occur, or if input prices rise faster than product prices.
Coefficient of variation Changes in a variable relative to the aver-
age value of the same variable. It permits a valid comparison of the
variation in variables measured in different units or between vari-
ables with different numerical values, e.g., variation in the price of
corn (in dollars per bushel) versus variation in corn production (in
billions of bushels).
Comparative (absolute) advantage The condition when a coun-
try produces and exports those goods and services which it can
produce relatively cheaply and imports those which other countries
can produce relatively cheaply. Absolute advantage implies a coun-
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try produces goods and services more cheaply than any other coun-
try.
Deficiency (compensatory) payments Disbursements from USDA
to any eligible producer equal to the difference for each unit of
applicable products between the market price, or the nonrecourse
price support loan, and a previously set target price.
Disposable income Earnings remaining after deductions of all
direct taxes on those earnings/income, and available to be spent,
invested, or saved as the receiver chooses.
Exogenous variable Any economic time series that influences, but
is not influenced by, a set of economic relationships being studied;
a variable that is determined outside the system of equations or
relationships.
Economies (diseconomies) of scale The reduction in per unit cost
of production associated with an increase in optimal size of opera-
tion usually resulting from specialization, division of labor, and
technology. Diseconomies are the increase in per unit cost of pro-
duction associated with nonoptimal growth in size resulting from
inadequate management.
Externality (economic) An economic impact of any activity by
an individual or business on others which is not reflected in the
market for that activity. The impact can be positive or negative.
Water pollution from farmland erosion can be a cost to the public
users of the water resource but is not a part of the costs of the
farm production.
Forward contracting An agreement between a buyer and seller
for future delivery of a commodity specifying quantity, quality,
place of delivery, price, and date. Exchange of title normally oc-
curs at the time of delivery.
Inelastic (elastic) demand as to price A market demand in which
a change in price will evoke a smaller proportional change in the
quantity purchased, i.e., consumers tend to consume about the
same amount regardless of the change in price, with the result that
less expenditures in the aggregate are made for a "large" produc-
tion than for a "small" one, and vice versa. An elastic demand
exhibits the opposite characteristics.
Inelastic (elastic) supply Supply is inelastic if the increase in pro-
duction is relatively less in response to a price change. If producers
are responsive to a price change by increasing production propor-
tionally more, supply is elastic.
Nonrecourse pnce support loan A price support loan set by the
Secretary of Agriculture within the 1977 Act offered usually for a
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marketing year to eligible farmers who put up specified storable
commodities as collateral. If the product is sold during that period,
the loan must be repaid plus interest; otherwise on the due date,
the product is transferred to government stocks to satisfy the loan
obligation. The government has "no recourse" to force repayment
—only to take over the commodity held as collateral.
Paid diversion A set annual per acre payment offered to producers
of specified products under agricultural price policy to induce their
voluntary participation in a program to withhold resources from
production, thereby balancing supply with demand at a higher price
level. In effect, it is in lieu of a rental payment—or return—for the
fixed resources being held idle.
Parameter An assigned constant value based on some type of sta-
tistical procedure, and can vary only when there is a structural or
behavioral change in the entire system being studied.
Parity price That current price for a unit of farm commodity
which would give it the same relative purchasing power for goods
and services as it had in 1910-14, adjusted for the changes in its
price over the past ten years compared to changes in the prices re-
ceived by farmers for all farm products during the same period.
Pipeline stocks Quantity of any product needed to perform the
normal processing and marketing operations.
Primary (derived) demand Final consumer or retail demand. De-
rived demand is primary demand minus processing and marketing
charges, and thus can be shifted due to changes in either, e.g., the
demand for corn, an important livestock input, is derived from the
retail demand for meat and other livestock products.
Protectionism Usually a reaction by an industry or company to
increasing foreign competition. The most common type of protec-
tionism is expressed in policy as an import tariff or quota imposed
to reduce imports and shield domestic producers.
Release price The price level at which farmers who have grain
stored in the grain reserve may sell it without incurring penalties.
It is established by the Secretary of Agriculture within the 1977
Act as a specified percentage above the nonrecourse loan level.
Returns to equity The net income or profit of a firm expressed as
a percent of its resources which are owned debt-free, i.e., the ex-
cess of its assets over its liabilities.
Salvage value The market price that an owner could receive for
any resource already used for some time in production, if it were
offered for sale. Such a value is usually less than acquisition cost
due to the preference of potential buyers for new, unused resources,
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due to location disadvantages, or to deterioration in the quality of
the resource for the intended production.
Target prices A value for a farm product set by the Secretary of
Agriculture within the 1977 Act for a production/marketing year,
usually at a level associated with—and changing with—production
costs. If the market price for that product, usually for the first five
months of its marketing year, averages less than this set value, eli-
gible producers may apply for supplementary payments from the
USDA equal to the lesser of the differences between the target
value and either the average market price or the nonrecourse price
support loan.
Trigger price A general term used to refer to the release and call
prices.
Utility An economic concept which reflects the level of satisfac-
tion an individual derives from the consumption of a particular
good or service.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
RELEVANT BACKGROUND DATA
FOR FUTURE AGRICULTURAL-FOOD POLICY
The data contained in this Statistical Appendix are drawn from
several different sources as indicated in the footnotes. The data are
presented in three different ways: 1) in current dollars, 2) in con-
stant 1972 dollars, and 3) as compound growth rates for selected
sets of years. All 1979 data are either preliminary or estimates.
The information found in this Statistical Appendix was selected
to form a common, consistent data base to be used as background
for the analysis contained throughout the document. Of particular
importance for agricultural and food policy analyses are data on
agricultural productivity, output, prices, and income and on the level
and variability of food prices. In addition, data on annual world
grain production, utilization, and stocks are presented. Trends in
agricultural trade are also presented.
Rapid changes have occurred in the structure of U.S. agriculture
in the post-World War II period. These changes have raised numerous
questions about the future structure of American agriculture. Selected
data reflecting structural change are included.
Finally, domestic food assistance programs have expanded rapidly
since the late 1960s. Selected data are presented on the aggregate
expenditures on various federal food and nutrition programs and on
food stamp participation rates.
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